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It would be hard to deny the important role played by emotions in the 
religious and philosophical landscape of India, from the most remote 
past to the present. The emotional attitude pervades most — if not all 
— intellectual and religious discourses of Indian culture. In a variety 
of knowledge traditions, emotions often provide a basis for the affec-
tive unfolding of conscious thought, thereby revealing its depth and 
intensity; emotions also constitute the most tangible and fundamental 
attitude in mankind’s quest for the sacred and self-discovery. 
The development of appropriate conceptual models for emotions in 
India has been discussed in recent years by scholars interested in various 
empirical domains and theoretical approaches. Studies have dealt with 
the social construction of emotions in India (Lynch 1990), historical–
cultural anthropology (Michaels and Wulf 2012), analysis of emotional 
complex, such as bhāva in the Bengali Vaiṣṇava tradition (McDaniel 
1989), the holistic nature of emotions in early Buddhist thought (de 
Silva 1995), or the ethics of emotions (Bilimoria 1995). The most com-
prehensive account on emotions in India still remains the pioneering 
three-volume work, Indian Psychology (2008), by Jadunath Sinha. Much 
more work, however, needs to be done to improve our understanding 
of emotions in India, especially with regard to historical development 
of emotional experience and the methods of its conceptualisation. This 
book constitutes a modest step in this direction, as it wishes to address 
the complex, and at times paradoxical, character of emotions in Indian 
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thought-systems, with an emphasis on the role of emotions in the con-
struction of religious identity. It poses a question about the defi nition, 
and validity, of emotions in classical India (3rd BCE–13th CE) by engag-
ing more fully with the argumentative context proposed by Corrigan 
(2008: 7) that ‘human emotionality is a constituent element of religious 
life’. Grounded in an analysis of the great textual cultures of India, among 
which the Sanskritic one stands out, the essays in this volume provide, 
as a whole, a theoretical evaluation of ‘Indian’ emotions by viewing them 
not merely as universal facts but also as culture-specifi c and historically 
determined phenomena. In so doing, the book makes an attempt to ven-
ture into the multi-faceted reality of emotions, unravelling its apparent 
equivocality and seeming inconceivability. It provides a glimpse of and 
tries to systematise historical and textual data on emotions in order to 
arrive at a conceptual schema that would be instrumental in defi ning 
the phenomenon of ‘human feeling’ in its various and multi-dimensional 
embodiments. An effort is made to provide an ingenious account of the 
mechanism of spontaneous activation of feelings in religious experi-
ence, and to elaborate emendations to the theoretical maze confounding 
the emotional and cognitive domains. Through the intellectual fusion 
and fruitful mingling of many theoretical perspectives, the book intends 
to broaden our understanding of the differences in the conceptualisation 
of emotions as they occur in the learned traditions of both India and 
‘the West’. Some essays provide an opportunity for looking with a fresh 
perspective at the so-called ‘negative emotions’, such as fear, despair or 
disgust, by showing the distinctive ways in which they become concep-
tualised in the Indian context. 
Before entering our discussion, something must be said fi rst about 
the etymology of the word ‘emotion’ and its Indian equivalent. The 
English term ‘emotion’ comes from the Latin emovere or exmovere (‘to 
move out’, ‘move away’, ‘remove’, ‘stir up’, ‘agitate’); hence Old French 
emouvoir (‘stir up’); Middle French ésmovoir ‘something moves inside 
when an emotion arises’); and French emotion (Freud used to speak of 
‘fl ows of energy’, from the unconscious to the conscious and vice versa). 
Robert C. Solomon, following David Hume (but with markedly different 
emphasis), preferred to call ‘emotion’ by the term ‘passion/passions’ 
(from Greek pathos and Latin pati [‘to suffer’, ‘be pathetic’]). But what 
exactly is ‘emotion’ or ‘emotions’? Both Western and Indian theories 
often speak of three mental states involved in the arousal of emotions: 
cognitive, conative (i.e., desire) and affective. Volition or will straddles 
the fi rst two. In the classical Sanskritic and Pāli tradition, there is no 
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single term that is a direct equivalent of the Western term ‘emotion’. In 
fact, there are several and they appear to be intermingled: some settle for 
bhāva or vedanā that are used in reference to the ‘emotive state’, which 
includes both the internal feeling and expressed emotion; others prefer 
vikāra, ‘mental excitement’, or rasa — though mostly in the context of 
drama, theatre (i.e., mime and nāṭya, or dance) and religious experience, 
expressed through bhakti in devotional traditions.
Theorising Emotions in the West
In the West, theorising on emotions begins with Aristotle (actually 
Plato in Phaedo, who was, however, narrowly concerned with grieving 
for the suicidal ingestion of hemlock by his teacher, Socrates). Where 
he took emotions seriously, Aristotle — along with Plato in Phaedo (sec-
tions 246a–254e, in Plato 2002: 96) — saw them as ‘bondage’, i.e., as the 
unruly horses which have to be restrained by reason, the charioteer; this 
judgment, as well as the very metaphor through which it is expressed, 
fi nds a parallel in mainstream Sanskrit literature from the Upaniṣads 
onwards, which provides the image of the chariot (the human body) 
driven by horses (indriyas, the sense organs) controlled (or rather not) 
by a charioteer (buddhi, the intellect). For the one who is not in con-
trol of his intellect, the sense organs become unmanageable, like the 
wicked horses of the charioteer. On the contrary, for the one who has a 
disciplined intellect, the sense organs are obedient horses subordinate 
to the charioteer (cf. Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.11). The worldview presented in 
this early metaphor — that seems to belong to a common Indo-European 
ancestry — delineates a sharp distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘emo-
tions’; the ‘emotions-senses’ are considered to be wild and disordered 
beasts that must be properly tamed by reason, otherwise they can only 
drive one astray. For Aristotle, emotions served an important function 
within his prime interest in ethics, i.e., the good life that involved culti-
vation of virtues for the ‘political zoon’ — man of excellence. The Greek 
philosopher concerned himself with a limited range of emotions, such 
as eros, a desirable emotion; akrasia, moral weakness; desire; pleasure 
(undesirable emotions); and the culmination of moral training (self-
control and cultivation of the worthy emotions) in the ultimate good 
of eudaimonia that is the fulfi lment or happiness by which one’s lived 
life is judged. 
Then, there were the Stoics who vied for a theory of complete dispas-
sion — what we may call ‘asceticism’ in English — wherein emotions are 
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curbed as they stand in the way of reasoned life; in some ways, perhaps 
also due to historical links, the Stoics’ view paralleled the view of Jainas, 
or in any event the broadly Śrāmaṇic concept of emotions (intended 
as sense-organs, or indriyas and their domains, the viṣayas) and desire 
considered to be the chief obstructions to the good life. The Stoics were 
opposed by the Epicureans who, much like the materialistic and atheistic 
Cārvākas known in Sanskrit sources, believed in gratifying the senses 
and living-up passions to the fullest. 
The medieval period of Western philosophical development witnessed 
a remarkable interest in emotions, intended as ‘higher passions’, i.e., 
‘pure’ love and faith, as well as ‘lower passions’, alias ‘sin’, which included 
unmitigated appetite, desire for intoxicants and sexual urge (Solomon 
2004: 3). Renaissance, marked by obsession with Humanism, revived the 
neo-Platonic understanding of emotions. The most popular Renaissance 
thinkers, viz., Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, offered 
a unique approach to the discourse on ‘Platonic love’ (Allen 2002: 923). 
Interesting contribution to the study of emotions came also from a poli-
tician and philosopher, Machiavelli, whose understanding of emotions 
was close to the realpolitik of public psychology. Machiavelli’s concept 
of ‘glory’ (gloria), which was recognised as ‘ambition’ or the emotion 
for honour, ‘was to become an important element in the list of emo-
tions acknowledged by fi gures from Montaigne to Hobbes’ (Zalta 2012). 
Closer to the Enlightenment period, Baruch Spinoza was fascinated 
by the idea of developing a geometry of passions, i.e., a ratio-centric 
model of emotions, to be achieved through meticulously individuating 
the thought components of each passion/emotion (de Silva 2011: 261). 
This model was later undone, or reversed by David Hume in defence of 
passion.1 Immanuel Kant (1996), for his part, excluded passions from 
the concerns of metaphysics, except for aesthetic judgments, and the 
‘sublime’ in particular. Kant’s original view privileged the cognitive over 
the affective and placed action within volition, which stood at the helm; 
this entailed a ‘deontological’, i.e., an impersonal life devoted to duty 
without regard for the fruits of action. According to this view, reason, 
rather than emotion, determines — in cohort with will — how one ought 
to act. Kant was not concerned with how and why one feels, or even why 
one acts, but rather with why would one act in such and such a way; thus, 
our base actions and such emotions as desire or anger that propel us are 
irrational and have no real place in the language of morality or ethics. 
Following the Enlightenment, there was no real philosophical space 
left for interest in, and debate over, emotions; emotions were regarded 
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as mere subjective, passive and passing events, at best ‘irrational’ states, 
i.e., non-cognitive aspects of human and animal life. Life, whether 
intelligent or not, was conceived of as nothing more than physiology 
and sensorial stimuli; no conceptual mileage could ever be gained by 
dwelling on emotions. The early psychologists, however, showed slightly 
more interest in emotions. William James and James Lange developed 
theories of the physiological origin of emotions as feelings that happen 
primarily in the body and, although lacking in cognitive content (though 
they can move to become such), represent the other extreme from the 
rationalist dismissal of emotions. With all its limitations, James’ theories 
are being passionately revived in our times, especially with the rise of 
neurophysiology and somatic studies (see Prinz 2003). Freud, the father 
of psychoanalysis, following Hume, explored the etiology of emotions 
and concluded that emotions are constituted by both affects and ideas. 
Freud dedicated much of his time to the understanding of ‘unconscious 
emotions’ caused by repression, which ‘results not only in withholding 
things from consciousness, but also in preventing the development of 
affect’ (see Green 1992: 58). The concept of repressed emotions, buried 
in a disguised form in the unconscious and popping up from time to 
time in dreams, was Freud’s most important contribution to the study 
of emotions. His psychoanalytic therapy focused on examining dreams 
as a way to reveal buried feelings resulting from childhood traumas.
Closer to our times, it was Solomon who opened new doors to 
philosophical thinking on emotions. For him, a passionate life ‘must be 
understood in terms of the desirability of strong passions in a rather 
particular sense, a sense that may well include romantic love, religious 
ecstasy, strong aversions, even hatred and the desire for vengeance 
and a highly charged sense of the drama of life’ (Solomon 1995: 290). 
Emotions, Solomon (2004: 117) contends, are orientated toward maxi-
mising self-esteem. For him, this is the form of spirituality, albeit secular 
spirituality, which human beings should aspire to, one which is ‘through 
and through an emotional spirituality’; a ‘spiritual life’ is ‘a life lived 
in accordance with the grand and thoughtful passions of life’ (Higgins 
2011: 240). Solomon’s account of ‘naturalized spirituality’ prominently 
involves some of the — to use an oxymoron — calm passions (though not 
ending in the dispassionate detachment or ‘indifference’, as he saw it 
in Jainism, Buddhism or Sāṃkhya–Yoga, and much less the dispassion-
ate life of pure reason); his view also combines refl ective orientation 
with emotion, to be fully attuned to attractions, gratitude, humour, 
grief (where this is needed), care for other human beings, and trust 
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and authenticity in our relationship with other human beings and the 
world at large. Absurdity, dialectical tensions, challenges, confusions, 
etc., should also be acknowledged with embrace, for they contribute to 
the unfolding evolution of human consciousness and provide a basis for 
the conviction that one’s life is worth living to reach the full potential of 
being human (and, hence, part of the shared ecological–animal habitat). 
One might even ‘live dangerously’. Along with Jean-Paul Sartre, Solomon 
argued that ‘our emotions structure the world we encounter, and no 
account of relationship to the world can dispense with acknowledging 
their constitutive role’ (Higgins 2011: 242–43). 
Cognitive Theory versus Conative-Affective Theory
Besides the oppositional division of reason and emotion into the respec-
tive categories of rational and irrational that is popular in Western 
mainstream culture — and which some Western philosophers still hold 
on to — a ‘cognitive’ versus ‘non-cognitive’ divide has been elaborated in 
recent studies which are very differentially marked to the former divide, 
in that no judgment as such is made on whether passions are rational or 
irrational dispositions. Nevertheless, there is still much at stake in the 
latter theorising inasmuch as emotions are aligned much closer to the 
cognitive processes than to the conative, volitional, or purely affected, 
i.e., processes that are desire-based in a primitive or crude sense. The 
role of the body, the embodied presence, and feelings, are accorded scant 
attention in this theory. The cognitive theory, ‘the dominant ideology 
among emotions theory today’ (Solomon 1995: 290) focuses on ‘thought’ 
and appraisal, with a teleology or purpose and meaning undergirding the 
process, while the non-cognitive or anti-cognitive theories (or, roughly, 
the so-called ‘conative-affective theories’), focus on physiological arousal 
centred in the body and feelings, as well as on neurophysiological pro-
cesses, sometimes also with a strong desire-component. So, the cognitive 
theory is tantamount to a mind–body dualism — a legacy of the Cartesian 
turn — or, in modern terms, the ideogenic view (attributed to Freud) and 
the somatogenic view (attributed to James) (de Silva 2011: 224).
The former view, which we may call ‘cognitivism’, looks for the cogni-
tive content of emotions in terms of potentially rational (i.e., rationally 
accessible) content of emotions, perceptions, or perspectives. In short, 
it regards ‘thought’ and, more importantly, ‘evaluative judgment’ or 
beliefs, as the category of propositional attitudes that philosophers 
have been most at home with, though not necessary excluding desires. 
According to cognitivist theories of emotion, ‘emotions logically or 
quasi-logically presuppose beliefs that both defi ne the emotion and, 
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if true, justify it. Love involves thinking highly of the beloved; embar-
rassment presupposes the belief that one has committed a faux pas; 
jealousy requires a belief in one’s entitlement to attention from another, 
and so on’ (Calhoun 2004: 116; cf. Calhoun 1990) and grief underscores 
the belief that someone valuably dear and close to one has been lost 
(Bilimoria 2012a). 
Against the inadequacy of the view of emotions as mere ‘feelings’, 
cognitivism holds that emotions themselves are (or involve) varieties 
of cognitive states (Marks 1995: 3). These relevant states have been 
variously argued to be a belief, a judgment, a thought, a construal (or 
‘seeing as’), an evaluation, etc. Solomon — once an ardent defender of 
this theory — believed that judgments, unlike beliefs, do not imply or 
suggest impersonality, value neutrality, or, to get to the point, lack of 
desire. He suggests that most of the judgments that constitute emotion 
do not clearly involve desires. Grief, for example, involves a judgment 
of severe loss. One might suggest that this reduces to belief, that some-
one has died, for example, and a desire (or rather counterfactual wish), 
namely, that they would not have died. But even if such an analysis is 
necessary, does it clarify or rather confuse the nature of the emotion? 
Solomon argues ‘that such belief-desire analyses . . . are misleading and 
often quite beside the point’ (1995: 191).
Solomon here is attacking two different theories about the signifi -
cant components of emotions. One is that emotions are beliefs without 
desires. The second is that emotions are beliefs with desire. One may 
argue that beliefs without desires are an essential ingredient of emo-
tion, or vice versa. Yet, this view muddies the analysis by taking both 
desires and emotions in tandem — which is precisely what the adversary 
whom he is attacking, Joel Marks, tends to do. Belief retains a necessary 
place within cognitive theories of emotions as the evaluative judg-
ment component, whereas desires are reduced counterfactually to the 
‘wish’ — or, indeed, the counter-belief that the given event that trig-
gered an emotion, such as grief, could or might have been otherwise. 
Alternatively, desires are sometimes relegated to a secondary status, 
as necessary yet not suffi cient conditions for an analysis of emotions. 
In grief, for example, the intense evaluative judgment or ‘appraisal’ 
element would include increasing references to an agent’s desires and 
goals, or the frustration of them. Since Solomon’s discussion with Marks, 
philosophers, such as William Lycan, William Alston, Roland Alan Nash, 
and to an extent Martha Nussbaum, among others, have insisted on the 
bodily disturbances — ‘unthinking energies’ — and perturbations of non-
intellectual mentation processes (Nussbaum’s ‘thought’) in the agent, 
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thereby including experiences, such as trembling, blushing, perspiring, 
pangs, throbs, tingles, burning and other sensations, adrenalin secre-
tions, increase in heart and respiratory rates, alterations of blood fl ow, 
changes in blood pressure, digestive processes, and other neurological 
symptoms. Indeed, these bodily reactions are considered fundamental 
structural markers of emotional response. And this is evidenced not just 
in human beings with their quaint sentimentality, but also in animals. 
These non-cognitive features of emotions, however, are not their 
essential ingredients, for they themselves as such are not the necessary 
and suffi cient conditions for the emotional encounter. Necessary and 
suffi cient conditions for emotion are relevant beliefs (of which there are 
three types, as indicated later) and perceptions. The rest of the features, 
viz., the non-belief, the ‘non-thinking features’, as Nussbaum calls them, 
or the objectless wandering feelings of pain and/or pleasure, are rel-
egated to the constitutive parts — even while she wonders aloud: ‘What 
are they like if they are not about anything?’. The three beliefs are: (a) 
that the suffering is serious; (b) that the person does not deserve the 
suffering; and (c) that the possibilities of the person who experiences the 
emotion are similar to those of the sufferer (Nussbaum 2001: 62). And so 
the jab in the stomach and sensations of being ripped by slivers of glass 
at the news of her mother’s impending death — like Arjuna’s inner tears 
at the death of his relatives in the Mahābhārata — are recastable in plain-
language propositional terms, i.e., resembling the structure of belief, or 
better, value judgments. The massive ramblings of her to me apart, what 
Nussbaum has ended up with is rather closer to the Hybrid Cognitive 
Theory that has been around since the late 1980s, in which perception 
and belief-state still maintain a hegemony, or are called the ‘paradigm 
case’, but in which non-propositional contents are not excluded, though 
these are viewed as the ‘messier’ side of emotion, linked to its own spe-
cifi c evaluative continuum and affective contents — see, for example, 
the works of Don Gustafson (1989), Ronald Alan Nash (1989) and Dan 
Moller (2007). The only exception is the perspicuous underscoring of 
resilience and caring by Moller. Nussbaum’s adversaries maintain that 
the unthinking markers are, indeed, the suffi cient elements of grief, 
and that the belief-propositional ingredients are constitutive or rather 
supplementary. This adversarial view, fi rst used against the Stoics, is 
that emotions are ‘unreasoning movements’, unthinking energies that 
simply push the person around and do not relate to conscious percep-
tions. Emotions are ‘bodily’ rather than ‘mental’, and it is suffi cient to 
make them unintelligent rather than intelligent. 
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Yet, one may ask if emotions could not be (a combination of) both 
‘bodily’ and ‘mental’? Perhaps, as Marks (1995) remarks, the most intrigu-
ing implication of the cognitive view is that emotions are subject to the 
same amount of criticism and control as cognitions are. While useful 
for the therapeutic encounter, the cognitive view has been challenged 
severally by evolutionary (survival) approach to emotion infl uenced 
by Charles Darwin, and more vehemently by Continental and Feminist 
philosophers. Some from these camps do not believe that either beliefs, 
judgment, evaluation, or cognition are essential components of emotion; 
these elements may be there in various phases of the arising, manifesta-
tion, impact, and effect of the emotion, and introspective or refl ective 
after-thought, but are otherwise peripheral, or at best supplementary to 
the feeling component, or whatever it is that makes an emotion what it is.
Solomon, towards the later years of his life, revised his earlier heavily 
cognitive account. He asked the question, which, we believe, needs to be 
asked of the cognitivist: ‘Can you make all of the evaluative judgments 
that supposedly constitute the emotion and nevertheless not have that 
emotion?’ And his verdict was: 
I have come to the conclusion after many years that the Adversary (now 
reinforced with some powerful studies in neurobiology) must be reckoned 
with, and that my old, rather ruthless line between those cognitive 
features of emotion that are essential and those non-cognitive features of 
emotion that are not essential was (in the context of the time) heuristic 
and is no longer so (Solomon 2002b: 900).2
Elsewhere, Solomon (2004: 85) elaborated on his retraction:
But what led me to an increasing concern about the role of the body and 
the nature and role of bodily feelings in emotion was the suspicion that my 
judgment theory had been cut too thin, that in pursuit of an alternative 
to the feeling theory I had veered too far in the other direction. I am 
now coming to appreciate that accounting for bodily feelings (not just 
sensations) in emotion is not a secondary concern and not independent 
of appreciating the essential role of the body in emotional experience.
By the same token, there are those who would concur with Solomon’s 
revisions to the dominant theory, but lay stress on other factors they 
consider essential in emotion, such as intellectualisation, not in a cogni-
tive, belief-propositional sense, but rather akin to what the Bhagavadgītā 
2.42 terms as vyavasāyātmikā buddhir eka eva (‘intellect is the only [sense 
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organ] fi xed in determination’). The claim is that there are ‘deep and 
systematic connections between emotional, evaluative, and intellectual 
strengths and abilities’; just as there are important emotional ‘aspects’ of 
the intellect, such as intellectual interest and excitement, an excellence 
celebrated, there are also intellectual ‘aspects’ to emotions (Stocker 
2004: 144). Post-Freudian psychoanalytical thinking has been attempting 
to close the chasm between intellect and emotion, or perhaps better put, 
between the ‘life of the mind’ and the ‘stirrings of the heart’, without 
rendering one dysfunctional at the expense of the other.
Theorising Emotions in India
The starting point of our inquiry into emotions in India is a thesis about 
the Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness that became the paradigm of 
classical Indian systems of knowledge and practice. On the basis of this 
premise, we construct our model of theorising emotions in India that 
rests on three basic presuppositions. We defi ne these presuppositions 
in the following manner. First, there is an alleged dualism between the 
mind–body complex and the Self variously termed as ātman, puruṣa, 
brahman, etc., that led to the devaluation of the body in relation to the 
Self. Second, emotions are the ‘foes’ that exist on the account of their 
association with the body; therefore, they should be rejected. Third, the 
body with its cognitive, emotional and sensorial apparatus is controlled 
through purity mechanism that involves, among other things, renun-
ciation of desire and yoga techniques. These general presuppositions 
informing the tradition of Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness are formulated 
differently in distinct theoretical frameworks of Indian thought-systems, 
and the specifi c structures in which they are implicated will become 
clearer once we embark on the systematic exposition of these systems.
In the modern and contemporary Western (and perhaps ‘Indian’ 
as well) imaginary, India, as opposed to the West, never elaborated a 
clear-cut dichotomy between mind, body, and soul or Self, but rather 
propounded a ‘holistic’ approach. That such allegations, by no means 
confi ned to the popular dimension but widespread in academic circles, 
fi nd little if no support in the primary sources of the Sanskrit philosophi-
cal tradition is revealed in this introduction. This basic premise provides 
an appropriate starting point in theorising emotions in India insofar as 
it conspicuously acknowledges the strict distinction between material-
ity of the ‘body’ and immateriality of the ‘spirit’ or ‘Self’ elaborated in 
Brāhmaṇical tradition. This way of conceiving the absolute distinction 
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between the mind–body complex and the Self had its philosophical basis 
in the Upaniṣads, of which the earliest texts were composed between 700 
and 300 BCE (Olivelle 1998) and in the school of Sāṃkhya represented by 
the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa dated to c. 4th century CE. These two 
thought-systems were directly responsible for the development of the 
Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness. 
The Upaniṣads with their distinctive ‘attitude of renunciation’ (see 
Padoux 1990: 38), fi rmly rooted in the contemplative stasis that barred 
the doors to the realm of the embodied existence experienced through 
the psychophysical aggregate of the body, are, perhaps, the fi rst to blame, 
for they provided conceptual insights that were appropriated into more 
explicit theoretical frameworks of later philosophies and theological 
systems of India (Olivelle 1998: 10). For example, the philosophical 
system of Advaita Vedānta, promulgated by Gauḍapāda (7th century 
CE) and Śaṅkara (8th century CE), is typically regarded as the most direct 
continuation of Upaniṣadic thought. The most striking innovation of 
the Upaniṣads for its time was the one that arose in direct response to 
Vedic ritualism. Questioning the dogmatic thrust of Vedic sacrifi ces, the 
Upaniṣads offered an opportunity for the deepest and most refl ective 
debate on the nature and meaning of the Self, life, death, and immortality 
(see Black 2007). Upaniṣadic attention was being irresistibly drawn to the 
philosophical concept of the Self (ātman) ‘that could be associated with 
a wide range of meanings including body and soul, and could sometimes 
refer to the ontological principle underlying all reality’ (ibid.: 7). Most 
of the Upaniṣads drew on Sāṃkhya metaphysics in accepting dualism 
between the consciousness-self (puruṣa) and the matter-body (prakṛti). 
According to the Sāṃkhya, the body, the psychosomatic apparatus, is 
the effect of prakṛti and, therefore, is considered to be the non-self that 
stands in opposition to the true Self (puruṣa). In the Upaniṣads, however, 
this alleged distinction between the spirit and matter is problematic and 
should be handled with care, as it has been challenged by many authors. 
The Upaniṣadic ātman can be said to both transcend the body and inhabit 
it as the agent of both sensing and cognising, but, nevertheless, it remains 
outside the body as the immortal soul. On this account, it is asserted that 
ātman has a capability of standing behind the various psychophysical 
operations of the body as their inner controller. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad 
(8.12.5, in Olivelle 1998: 285) refers to it in the following words:
He sees but he can’t be seen; he hears, but he can’t be heard; he thinks, 
but he can’t be thought of; he perceives, but he can’t be perceived. Besides 
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him, there is no one who sees, no one who hears, no one who thinks, and 
no one who perceives. It is the self of yours who is the inner controller, 
the immortal. All besides this is grief. 
This passage explicitly distinguishes between the subject and the 
object, posing, thus, a split at the heart of the Upaniṣadic epistemology 
and ontology. The immortal, non-empirical Self is conceived of as a 
perceiving subject that can never be an object of perception, even if it 
exists as the unitary ontological foundation responsible for the respec-
tive functions of the mind–body complex. Even more important in this 
regard is the notion that the mind–body apparatus is controlled by a 
single, self-regulating and immaterial principle of ātman. The concept 
of bodily, mental and emotional control that implied ‘overcoming one’s 
attachment to the body-mind complex’ (Holdrege 1998: 361) by culti-
vating the ascetic body witnessed a dramatic resurgence in the later 
Upaniṣads, particularly in the so-called Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads promulgating 
a life of a world-renouncer (saṃnyāsin, parivrājaka, bhikṣu). Nevertheless, 
this ‘ambiguous’ language of the Upaniṣads has invited divergent and 
mutually exclusive interpretations from some scholars that systemati-
cally invalidate the Self–body dualism. An example of such divergent 
interpretations of a fundamental Upaniṣadic doctrine is illustrated in 
the following passage:
In the Upanishads there is no indication of this antagonistic relation of 
the body and spirit. On the other hand bodily existence was regarded as 
an opportunity for spiritual realisation. The body is not the prison of the 
soul but a habitat for it, or a temple in which the soul can work out its 
salvation by worship and meditation (Tiwari 1985: 178). 
Obviously, this position demonstrates the pitfalls and possibilities of the 
hybrid interpretations of the Upaniṣadic thought from a wide array of 
vantage points.3 In our view, however, the Self–body dualism is inher-
ently presupposed in the Upaniṣadic discourse, for, it is declared in the 
Chāndogya Upaniṣad (8.12.5, in Olivelle 1998: 285): 
This body, Maghavan, is mortal; it is in the grip of death. So, it is the 
abode of this immortal and nonbodily self. One who has a body is in the 
grip of joy and sorrow, and there is no freedom from joy and sorrow for 
one who has a body. Joy and sorrow, however, do not affect one who has 
no body. 
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Not only is body effectively contrasted with non-bodily Self as its nega-
tive counterpart, as if its sole purpose were to expose the inevitability 
of death attached to the body, it is also posited as the source of both 
positive and negative emotions, which are regarded as bondages. All 
the emotional states experienced by an individual are being closely 
connected with the functioning of the body. The release from the body 
is congruent with freedom from emotional processes. The desirability of 
liberation presupposes turning away from the imperfect body, which is 
additionally assigned with the moral attribute of evilness:4 ‘Shaking off 
evil, like a horse its hair, and freeing myself, like the moon from Rāhu’s 
jaws, I, the perfected self (ātman), cast off the body, the imperfect, and 
attain the world of brahman’ (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 8.15.1, in Olivelle 
1998: 287). Here, the inevitable drama of life that inheres in the darkness 
of embodiment may be overcome through the relinquishment of the evil 
body. Casting off the body includes implicitly the attainment of a meta-
physical principle of identity in which the perfected self (ātman) and the 
Absolute (brahman) are harmonised. Similar dialectical devices employed 
in making the duality between the Self and the body explicit are found 
in the Muktika Upaniṣad, adhyāya 2: ‘This body is very impure while the 
one (ātman) that dwells in it is very pure’ (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 11). 
Here, a criterion of division between the body and the Self (ātman) is laid 
down along the lines that establish the duality of pure and impure. From 
the aforementioned premises that systematically rejected the notion of 
the body, it is generally accepted that the Upaniṣads are the fi rst texts 
to be credited with conceiving of the fi gure of world-renouncer5 in a 
manner that became paradigmatic to the entire Brāhmaṇical model of 
emotionless spirituality.6 Now, in order to delineate the soteriological 
principles inherently present in the ascetic way of life promulgated 
by Upaniṣadic thought, we take a closer look at the later Upaniṣads, of 
which the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, the text classifi ed as belonging 
to the genre of the Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, stands out. The fi rst two pas-
sages quoted from different texts formulate their concept of the body as 
being essentially impure. Interestingly, in the fi rst passage this impurity 
of the body is articulated in terms of a caste-structured Brāhmaṇical 
society, in which an outcast is traditionally regarded impure:7 ‘Shun 
like an outcast (cāṇḍāla) [the thought of] the body, which is generated 
out of the impurities of parents and is composed of excreta and fl esh. 
Then you will become Brahman and be in a blessed [state]’ (Adhyātma 
Upaniṣad, ibid.: 54). In the second passage, the impurity of the body is 
directly connected with its given attribute of being the seat of emotions: 
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This body is subject to birth and death. It is of the nature of secretion 
of the father and mother. It is impure, being the seat of happiness and 
misery. [Therefore] bathing is prescribed for touching it. It is bound by 
the dhātus (skin, blood, etc.), is liable to severe disease, is a house of sins, is 
impermanent and is of changing appearance and size. [Therefore] bathing 
is prescribed for touching it. Foul matter is naturally oozing out always 
from the nine holes. It [the body] contains bad odour and foul excrement. 
[Therefore] bathing is prescribed for touching it . . . The release from [the 
body] is spoken of as the perfect purifi cation. (Maitreya Upaniṣad, Khanna 
and Aiyar 2011: 24).
Apart from the emotional drives through which the human body 
becomes submerged in dirt, the Upaniṣads saw this impurity in rela-
tion to body’s natural physiological processes, as well as in the very act 
of conception resulting in the embryo. To provide some sense of the 
scope of the Upaniṣadic notion of spiritual perfection, a few of the many 
themes which reverberated down through Indian intellectual history 
are outlined in the following sections.
‘Purifi cation’ and ‘Control’
The Upaniṣads argue that central to salvation, understood in terms of 
release from the impure body, is a set of practices which they identifi ed 
as ‘purifi cation’ and ‘control’. These can be regarded as two comple-
mentary aspects of the Brāhmaṇical model of spirituality. The body 
and emotional apparatus that belongs to the body are considered to be 
essentially impure and evil, and so is the sensory experience, ‘sound, 
touch, and others which seem to be wealth (artha) are in fact evil’ 
(Maitreya Upaniṣad, ibid.: 24). Thus, subjugation or control of the sen-
sory experience is thought of as purifi cation (śauca).8 On the contrary, 
the lack of control means being dragged down to the weakness of the 
fl esh. The conquest of the senses leads to the destruction of emotional 
fl uctuations that impel saṃsāra: 
Through attraction of the senses, he becomes subject to fault, there is no 
doubt: through their control, he gains perfection . . . It should be known 
that that man who does not rejoice or grieve through hearing, touching, 
eating, seeing, or smelling is a conqueror of the organs (Nāradaparivrājaka 
Upaniṣad, upadeśa 3, ibid.: 132).
Therefore, ‘[h]e becomes fi t for salvation through the control of the 
organs, the destruction of love and hate and non-injury to beings. He 
should abandon all identifi cation with this feeble, perishable and impure 
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body’ (Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, upadeśa 3, ibid.: 133). Indeed, the high-
est spiritual state of perfect isolation (kevala) is achieved when one is 
freed from emotions-cum-sins, namely the stains of passion, anger, fear, 
delusion, greed, pride, lust, birth, death, miserliness, swoon, giddiness, 
hunger, thirst, ambition, shame, fright, heart-burning, grief, and glad-
ness (Yogatattva Upaniṣad, ibid.: 181). 
As Gavin Flood (2006: 40) has observed, the restraint of the senses 
and the body that is aimed at controlling the senses and avoiding the 
impurity seems to have been an underlying message of the Manusmṛti or 
the ‘Laws of Manu’ (c. 200 BCE–200 CE), arguably the principal Dharmaśāstra. 
Similar disclaimers of the sensory and emotional experiences in favour 
of a higher knowledge are found in the Arthaśāstra (c. 4th century BCE–
1st century CE), an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft devoted to the 
subject of a ‘social body’ (ibid.: 43) and to the description of king’s duties 
formulated in the concept of a kingly sage (rājaṛṣi). Thus, according to 
the exposition given in the Arthaśāstra, the kingly sage who wishes for a 
long and prosperous rule should follow the rules of conduct that include 
the control of his senses ‘by eliminating vices of lust, anger, greed, pride, 
arrogance and excitability’ (ibid.). The control of the senses later became 
the crux of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga practice. 
‘Removal of the Pains of Agency’
The Upaniṣads claim that a person is an agent (kartṛ) on account of his 
association with a psychophysical mind–body apparatus. A characteristic 
feature of an agent is his capability to experience ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’. 
These experiences are immediately processed by the mind resulting in 
emotional reactions characterised by feelings of ‘love’ and ‘hate’. Thus, 
an individual is called an agent because he is capable of experiencing 
emotional effects fraught with the feelings of ‘love’ and ‘hate’ that are 
procured by his engagement in the sensory experience. These types of 
experiences pertaining to the agent are, according to the Upaniṣads, 
the source of saṃsāra or bondage. In addition, they are also qualifi ed 
as constituting the primordial ignorance (avidyā). On this account, ‘the 
attainment of eternal bliss takes place through the removal of the pains 
of agency’ (Muktika Upaniṣad, in Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 6) that belongs 
to the agent. The Sarvasāra Upaniṣad (ibid.: 14) elucidates on this topic 
in the following words: 
The actor (or agent) is the one who possesses the body and the internal 
organs through their respective desires proceeding from the idea of 
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pleasure and pain. The idea of pleasure is that modifi cation of the mind 
known as love. The idea of pain is that modifi cation of the mind known 
as hate. The cause of pleasure and pain are sound, touch, form, taste and 
odour. The original ignorance has the characteristics of the above fi ve 
groups.
At least two issues regarding the etiology of emotions are outlined 
here. First, all types of emotions, whether ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, seem to 
be triggered by fi vefold sensory perception, comprised of sound, touch, 
form, taste, and odour. Second, emotions, such as ‘love’ or ‘hate’, are 
considered to be modifi cations of the mind in a sense in which they are 
a result of mental processing of sensory data experienced as ‘pleasure’ 
or ‘pain’. The concept of emotions outlined in the aforecited passage 
resembles that of the Sāṃkhya system which believes that intellect 
(buddhi) is the primary organ for experiencing feelings or emotions, 
evaluated as ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’. According to the Sāṃkhya, the realm 
of affects composed of positive (i.e., ‘pleasure’) and negative (i.e., ‘pain’) 
feelings is considered to be an unconscious mode of prakṛti.
In the Upaniṣadic thought, therefore, the notion of ‘agency’ is con-
fi ned to the manner in which a person engages himself in the sensory 
experience, thereby prompting the arousal of emotions and identifying 
them as being coordinated by mind. Sensing, thinking and feeling exist 
in conformity with the primarily axiom of ‘agency’. Moreover, sensing, 
thinking and feeling have an important bearing on the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of the Upaniṣadic doctrine insofar as 
they undermine the value of a person who, on account of being an agent, 
is held in bondage and ignorance. It then appears that the liberating 
movement away from bondage and ignorance indicates the ‘removal of 
the pains of agency’ and, hence, the elimination of any kind of sensory 
and cognitive activity. It is stated in the upadeśa 3 of Nāradaparivrājaka 
Upaniṣad (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 135): ‘He who, having withdrawn the 
organs within, like a turtle its limbs [within its shell], is with the actions 
of the organs and the mind annihilated, without desire . . . he alone is 
emancipated’. Hence, liberation, understood in terms of suspension of 
all activities, results in the attainment of the state of ‘witness-conscious-
ness’ (sākṣin-caitanya): ‘Having subdued the sensual organs and having 
given up the conception of “mine” in all objects, you should place your 
consciousness of “I” in me who am the witness-consciousness’ (Varāha 
Upaniṣad, ibid.: 206). This state of witness-consciousness is characterised 
as wisdom and absolute Self because ‘it is the seat of the eternal and 
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emancipated brahman which is far superior to breaths, the organs of 
sense and action, the internal organs of thought, the guṇas and others, 
which is of the nature of saccidānanda and the witness to all’ (Nirālamba 
Upaniṣad, ibid.: 22). The idea of liberation promoted here, in fact, replaces 
the agency pertaining to the embodied individual with the non-agency 
of the Self assuming the form of a static witness. This particular model 
of disembodied and non-agential spirituality is most fully developed in 
the philosophical system of Advaita Vedānta, ‘the most widely accepted 
system of thought among philosophies of India’ (Gupta 1998: 1) and 
promulgated primarily by Śaṅkara (8th century CE). For Śaṅkara, the 
Self is without action, and the realisation of the non-agency of the Self 
is a goal of an ascetic practice. Śaṅkara’s position has been summarised 
by Flood (2004: 68–69) in the following words: 
As action pertains only to the body and senses, it is really non-existent in 
the self (ātmani karmābhāva), as has been taught in primary and secondary 
revelation and in logic (śruti, smṛti and nyāya). Action is falsely attributed 
to the self, and should anyone think ‘I am the agent’ (ahaṃ kartā) or ‘I act’ 
(ahaṃ karomi), he or she would be mistaken in attributing qualities to the 
immutable self that do not belong to it. The person who understands 
this is a controlled yogi (yukto yogī), wise, free, and whose purpose has 
been achieved. For Śaṇkara, self-knowledge is the wisdom that the self 
is without agency and that agency is illusory within the realm of nature 
(prakṛti) . . . Liberating knowledge means the realisation that the self 
is passive. The true self for Śaṅkara is the immutable, passive witness 
(sākṣin)9 who in reality is untouched by action and ignorance or by the 
coverings (upādhi) that appear to separate the self from true, refl exive 
knowledge. This undifferentiated self is not individual, but universal 
consciousness or spirit (brahman).
The second strand of thought that infl uenced the Brāhmaṇical ideal 
of emotionlessness was the Sāṃkhya–Yoga. These two systems, featuring 
among the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy (darśanas),10 are 
usually treated as equally justifi ed aspects of a unitary thought-system. 
On this account, Sāṃkhya is understood to provide the metaphysical 
framework or the theory of the system, while Yoga furnishes this theory 
with practice. The most representative text of the Sāṃkhya system is 
the Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (c. 4th century CE). Among the com-
mentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the most frequently studied is the 
Tattvakaumudī (c. 940 CE), composed by Vācaspati Miśra. A few indepen-
dent works were also composed over the centuries. The most popular 
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among them is the anonymously authored Yuktidīpīka of c. 680–720 CE 
(Potter 2005: 626). The classical Yoga system is represented by the Yoga 
Sūtra of Patañjali (c. 200 CE). The most important commentary on the 
Yoga Sūtra is the Vyāsabhāṣya attributed to Vyāsa (c. 650–850 CE). 
The fundamental metaphysical premise of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga doc-
trines is the absolute distinction between the consciousness-self (puruṣa) 
and matter or nature (prakṛti). Puruṣa is the seat of pure consciousness 
(cetanā) without content, the inactive spectator, dissociated from any 
empirical experience, while prakṛti is the real cause of real effects respon-
sible for bringing forth the psychophysical organism of macrocosmic 
(nature) and microcosmic (mind–body complex) type consisting of a 
different modes of awareness, emotions, sensations, physicality, and 
the senses; prakṛti, therefore, accounts for everything that constitutes 
the world of our empirical existence. According to the precepts of the 
Sāṃkhyakārikā (SK 1, in Burley 2007: 6) and Yoga Sūtra (YS 2.16, ibid.), 
the empirical experience given to us is a result of our embodiment. It 
is negatively evaluated as the source of distress or suffering (duḥkha) 
and, thus, ‘the utter relinquishment of experience and of the embodied 
personality’ is said to be the precondition (SK 68, ibid.: 20) of liberation 
(kaivalya). The ultimate soteriological goal of the Sāṃkhya–Yoga is the 
attainment of the state of puruṣa who is additionally characterised as the 
seer (draṣṭṛ) and witness (sākṣin) (SK 19; YS 2.20, ibid.: 77). The movement 
in the direction of puruṣa implies, on the metaphysical level, the return 
of the manifest prakṛti into its un-manifest source (prakṛtilaya)11 which, 
in turn, on the individual level, implies ‘forsaking everything that marks 
one out as a person in the fi rst place including body, mind, memory, 
etc.’ (Burley 2007: 133). In effect, as Georg Feuerstein (1989: 74) points 
out, ‘emancipation . . . abolishes man’s false organismic identity and re-
locates him into the Self’, the puruṣa. In the Sāṃkhya–Yoga, the fact of 
embodiment lies at the centre of something antithetical to all knowledge 
and truth. Vociferous insistence on the embodiment’s essential worth
lessness is followed by an insistence on its being the cause of distress. 
Since duḥkha, understood as an unfortunate consequence of embodi-
ment, acquires such a prominent place in these systems, it is important 
to look at the wider metaphysical context in which it is formulated. 
The negative conclusion regarding the existential pain of embodiment 
is derived entirely from prakṛti. Prakṛti is said to be endowed with three 
qualities (triguṇa): sattva, rajas and tamas. The entire psychophysical 
conception of the world of experience is built up and supported by this 
threefold constitution (triguṇa) inherently present in prakṛti. In other 
 Introduction  19
words, each object of perception given in empirical experience is a result 
of the transformation or the creative co-mingling of these three guṇas. 
Interestingly, the guṇas are defi ned in accordance with the emotional 
attitudes that operate in them. Therefore, each object of experience 
has the capability to give rise to the divergent and mutually disparate 
emotions of joy, pain, or sorrow. The Sāṃkhyakārikā gives a systematic 
classifi cation of the triguṇa and the emotional attitude specifi c to each 
of them. On this account, sattva-guṇa governs the pleasurable (SK 12, in 
Jacobsen 2002: 245), the joyful (prīti) and the satisfactory experience 
(sukha). Thus, according to the Sāṃkhyakārikā (SK 54, ibid.), the divine 
world is rich in the emotional dimension of sattva. Rajas gives rise to 
distress (duḥkha), unhappiness (aprīti), hatred (dveṣa), malice (droha), 
envy (matsara), blame (nindā), pride (stambha), sexual desire (utkaṇṭhā), 
dishonesty (nikṛti). Rajas is the determining factor which causes excite-
ment, misery, anger, and anxiety; as such, it is said to dominate the 
emotional distraught of the human world (ibid.: 245–46). Tamas governs 
the experience of stupefaction and bewilderment. It is responsible 
for grief (viṣāda), confusion (moha), fear (bhaya), depression (dainya), 
intoxication (mada), and insanity (unmāda). It dominates animal and 
plant life (ibid.: 246). This classifi cation is helpful in understanding the 
division into the three divergent tendencies that operate in the world. 
Nevertheless, one has to remember that every phenomenon is a specifi c 
combination of these three distinct emotional tendencies. In addition, 
triguṇa exists in a state of constant transformation that gives rise to dif-
ferent juxtapositions between the guṇas. Because of its mutable structure 
innately constituted by the fl uctuating character of triguṇa, the same 
phenomenon may cause pleasure to some and pain to others. This posi-
tion is summarised by S. N. Dasgupta (1979: 85) in the following words: 
[A]ll the mental states as well as all kinds of things are characterised as 
pleasurable (sukha), painful (duḥkha), and blinding (moha); it is therefore 
that these [three] guṇas being also transformed as the external objects 
as the jug, etc., produce by mutual correlations the feelings of pleasure, 
pain and blindness. If the objects were not modifi ed in that way, there 
should be no reason why with the merest connection with the objects 
there should rise painful or pleasurable states of mind. It is for this 
reason that we hold that the modifi cations in the objects, which serve to 
determine the mental states in a painful or pleasurable way, are nothing 
but themselves the transformations of the elementary feeling entities 
(guṇas) of pleasure, pain, etc.
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The Yoga Sūtra 2.15 (Jacobsen 2002: 245) associates this constant trans-
formation of the three guṇas in the objects of perception with the 
source of suffering: ‘The discriminating person sees all objects as painful 
because they cause suffering as a consequence, as affl iction (kleśa) and 
as saṃskāra, and because of the mutual opposition of the transforma-
tions of the guṇas’.12
The Sāṃkhya–Yoga continues to refi ne our understanding of the 
threefold constitution (triguṇa) that is structurally present in every 
phenomenon or object of the empirical world and the emotional distress 
(duḥkha) that underlines all existence in the sophisticated setting of 
interrelatedness based on the philosophical dictum that ‘everything is 
of a nature of everything else’ (sarvaṃ sarvātmakam). As Knut A. Jacobsen 
(ibid.: 250) demonstrates: 
It is in fact because of the interdependency of all the products of prakṛti 
that freedom from duḥkha cannot be attained without total separation 
from prakṛti. The fact that everything is connected to everything else is 
the cause of misery and disharmony, according to Sāṃkhya and Yoga. 
Connected things act both harmoniously and disharmoniously because 
they act according to their own nature. 
According to the commentary of Vyāsabhaṣya on YS 2.15, because of 
the interconnectedness of all things, ‘no enjoyment is possible without 
hurting others (nānupahatya bhūtāni upabhogaḥ saṃbhavati), so every 
enjoyment produces demerit’ (ibid.: 246). The author refers here to the 
threefold suffering (duḥkhatraya) mentioned in the fi rst verse of the 
Sāṃkhyakārikā. One type of duḥkhatraya is the suffering caused by other 
beings (ādhibhautika) which is the specifi c manifestation of a mutual 
interdependency discussed earlier. Liberation involves freeing oneself 
from this interdependency that must necessarily lead to the destruc-
tion of embodiment, for, according to the precepts of the Sāṃkhyakārikā 
(SK 55, in Larson 2001: 155), ‘as long as there is embodiment, there will 
be suffering’.
The central aim of Sāṃkhya–Yoga is a negative utility, namely free-
ing oneself from the entanglement of embodiment caused by prakṛti 
that naturally leads to the eradication of future suffering (YS 2.16, in 
Burley 2007: 6). The Yoga suggests methods for its elimination from the 
human scene which are missing in the theory-oriented Sāṃkhya. These 
methods, comprised of a closely connected set of disciplines that include 
‘practice’ (abhyāsa) and ‘detachment’ (vairāgya), developed out of the 
 Introduction  21
Brāhmaṇical ‘obsession’ with control and purifi cation. The word yoga 
is derived from the verbal root yuj, meaning ‘to control’, or ‘to yoke’. 
The proper sense of yoga, thus, predicates ‘mastery’ and ‘subjugation’ 
(Tola and Dragonetti 1987: 1). Employment of the word yoga to denote 
‘restraint’ or ‘control’ was already known in the Upaniṣads, where its 
linguistic usage was applied to the control of the senses. In the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad (2.6.11), ‘the fi rm holding back of the senses is called Yoga’ 
(Dasgupta 1979: 44). Such a controlling predicate of the term yoga was 
certainly retained in the restraining disciplines of abhyāsa and vairāgya 
that aimed at ‘immobilising the continual fl uctuation of the individual 
body-emotions-mind complex’ (citta-vṛtti-nirodha) through suppression 
of bodily and mental instability (Torella 2011: 92–94). Before turning to 
the description of these disciplines in more depth, however, it is worth 
pausing to make a few remarks about the specifi c place occupied by 
emotions in India, the place in between ‘mind’ and ‘heart’. Theorising 
emotions in India poses some diffi culties, for unlike emotions in the West, 
‘Indian’ emotions cannot be reduced either to the affective-conative 
theory, nor to the cognitive theory. On the contrary, ‘Indian’ emotions 
seem to oscillate freely between the two, that is to say they are not 
entirely cognitive on the one hand, nor entirely reducible to feelings 
as sensations, but rather something mid-way between reason’s thought 
and an inspirational ‘heart-felt feeling’, on the other. As June McDaniel 
(2008: 54) observes: ‘In the Bengali and Sanskrit languages, terms for 
emotion and thought, mind and heart, are not opposed. Indeed, most 
frequently the same terms are used for both’. This implies that emotion 
and cognition do not seem to be opposite to each other, forming two 
exclusive classes. In accordance with the classical Indian philosophy, 
emotions are cognitions (jñāna, vijñāna), the justifi ed mental phenomena 
not less rational than complex thought-processes. In this regard, the 
term citta, as it has been used in the Yoga system, is generally translated 
as the ‘mind’ and consists of a creative mingling of cognitive, cona-
tive and affective aspects. The citta is not only mind, it is precisely the 
body–emotions–mind complex which is considered to be the oppressive 
burden that needs to be purged. This can be accomplished through the 
restraining disciplines of abhyāsa and vairāgya (YS 1.12–16, in Jacobsen 
2002: 284). Practice (abhyāsa) is defi ned as a continuous effort to acquire 
stability (sthiti) of citta (YS 1.13, ibid.), which is characterised by its peace-
ful fl ow (praśāntavāhitā) (YS 3.10, ibid.). Detachment (vairāgya) involves 
forsaking the thirst (tṛṣṇā) for worldly objects (YS 1.15, ibid.). Vairāgya, 
which is translated by Monier-Williams as the ‘freedom from worldly 
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desires’ and whose semantics includes also the meaning of ‘dispassion’, 
puts emphasis on the renunciation of the objects of desire, and as such 
it can be said to be the main spiritual attitude of an adept aspiring for 
liberation in the Brāhmaṇical context. 
In terms of the precise meaning of this term given in the Yoga Sūtra, 
yoga as a technique of spiritual discipline involves the cessation of the 
activity of body–emotions–mind complex (yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ) by 
engaging oneself in the practices that aim at reversing the tendency for 
the outward fl ow of the mind and the senses directed towards the objects 
of perception. By ‘turning within’, a yogin induces the reversal process 
that attempts, in the Sāṃkhya terms, to free puruṣa from the shackles 
of prakṛti. That is achieved by puruṣa’s ‘split with the body’ (śārīra-bheda) 
and by prakṛti’s withdrawal to the dormant state (SK 65, Burley 2007: 134). 
As Mikel Burley says: ‘Not only, then, does the mind (citta) cease to oper-
ate, but the entire world of ostensibly physical objects dissolves, leaving 
only an unmanifest and dormant prakṛti, plus, of course the now solitary 
puruṣa, who abides in purely its own nature (svarūpa)’ (ibid.). The salvifi c 
goal of Sāṃkhya–Yoga is the same state of perfect isolation (kaivalya) of 
puruṣa that entails a termination of puruṣa’s false identifi cation with that 
which is not self (anātman) (YS 2.5, ibid.: 131), namely prakṛti. As Burley 
(2007: 140–41) has demonstrated, from the aforestated premises, it, 
then, appears that liberation (kaivalya) in Sāṃkhya–Yoga is considered 
to be a disembodied and mindless state in a sense in which the yogin’s 
body and mind, as a part of a wider psychophysical nature (prakṛti), get 
dissolved into the unmanifest state upon prakṛti’s return to inactivity. 
Thus, upon the total cessation of citta that is the body–emotions–mind 
complex, only the solitary puruṣa remains who is pure consciousness 
beyond empirical experience. This is the condition of liberation which 
Gerlad Larson (2001: 205) calls ‘emptiness’: ‘“Emptiness” or “nothing-
ness” appears to be appropriate terms, for the condition of salvation in 
classical Sāṃkhya is the condition of the puruṣa in itself. It is the reversal 
of the dialectical relationship of prakṛti and puruṣa’. 
 An idea, attended to clearly in the Sāṃkhya–Yoga system, purpose-
fully holds human body–emotions–mind complex as the domain of 
bondage and suffering and presents a framework for its suppression, 
control, or its realisation of being the form of ignorance (avidyā) that 
stands in opposition to pure consciousness of puruṣa, the solitary wit-
ness and the seer. The practical devices for this realisation comprise 
different forms of meditative techniques of concentration based on the 
principle of reversal (pratiprasava) of the mind–body–senses from the 
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objects given in the empirical existence. This practice has at its aim the 
return to the pristine state of utter disembodiment, where only ‘empti-
ness’ shines forth. 
The Upaniṣads and the Sāṃkhya–Yoga were fundamental in building 
up the theoretical framework of the Brāhmaṇical thought that, in effect, 
paved the way for an all-encompassing spiritual ideal of emotionless-
ness that promoted the value of renunciation and disembodied purity 
achieved through the control of mind, emotions, body, and senses. As 
Alexis Sanderson (1985) has demonstrated, the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy 
was constructed from the notion of ‘identity–through–purity’ that oper-
ated on two levels, the physical and the social. The ideal Brāhmaṇa was 
required to avoid any contact with substances, places, persons, foods, 
drinks, and dresses that were marked impure in the orthodox scriptures. 
Brāhmaṇical ‘identity–through–purity’ was, therefore, necessarily sub-
ject to the implicit norms of beliefs and conduct imposed by scriptural 
injunctions and prohibitions. In conformity with Brāhmaṇical ortho-
praxy, the greatest enemy of the ideal Brahman was ‘the spontaneity of 
the senses and his highest virtue immunity to emotion in unwavering 
self-control’ (ibid.: 193). It is important to remember that Brāhmaṇical 
discourse, formulated along the lines of emotional immunity and self-
control, heavily infl uenced the soteriological concepts of Buddhism,13 
Jainism and Śaiva Siddhānta, and that it was itself infl uenced by their 
discourses. At least three distinctive Indian traditions took a very differ-
ent stand on emotions, i.e., one that systematically rejected, or at least 
challenged, the Brāhmaṇical view. Among them, we fi nd Tantrism, the 
Bhakti movement and Aesthetics. These three unique thought-systems 
of India arose in response to the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy. It was through 
participation in this Brāhmaṇical emotionless worldview that all of 
these new discourses were created to present new vistas for spiritual 
perfection, positively engaging the realm of emotions. In examining 
what often seem to be competing and opposing discourses, this book 
makes an attempt to reconstruct, in a way, the discussion on emotions 
expounded in different religious and philosophical traditions of India 
that clashed with the Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness. Building on the 
theory of socio-cultural evolution, understood in terms of a historical 
development of ideas that are actively shaped by mainstream categories 
of understanding, this book tries to anchor the process of theorising 
emotions in India within a wider framework of the Brāhmaṇical ortho-
praxy. In this way, the commonly accepted canon of the Brāhmaṇical 
emotionlessness is regarded as a shared basis on which all these new 
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discourses yield their revelation of emotional richness. In addition, this 
book also allows discussion with those thought-systems of India that are 
typically regarded as continuing the Brāhmaṇical legacy of emotionless-
ness: Buddhism, Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta, by showing 
how surprisingly far these systems go toward explaining the seemingly 
dysfunctional character of emotions, regarding them as a necessary aid 
to spiritual development. The collection of essays constituting the pres-
ent volume is divided into four parts refl ecting four streams of Indian 
thought-systems: (a) Tantrism; (b) the Bhakti movement; (c) Buddhism, 
Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta; and (d) Aesthetics. Each 
part includes two or three essays offering different approaches in con-
ceptualising emotions in India. Before turning to the respective essays, a 
reader is advised to read an introduction to each part fi rst. The purpose 
of the introduction is, primarily, to provide a reader with a theoretical 
foundation for the discussion on emotions that is followed in the essays.
Tantrism
Tantrism was a socio-religious movement that represented a concen-
trated effort to counteract the prevailing Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy by 
rejecting its purity-bound system of belief and practice. Interestingly, 
this rejection of orthopraxy was not achieved by a simple elimination of 
its dogmatic injunctions but rather by its implicit inclusion in a typology 
of graded revelation of the śāstras, where the orthodox scriptures, i.e., 
the Vedas, occupied a lower position. Tantric scriptures wanted to dis-
tance themselves from the scriptural canon of Brāhmaṇism, maintaining 
that their stance was not to condemn the Brāhmaṇical practice but to 
demonstrate that the tantric revelation was superior to it. Central to this 
assertion was the establishment of a division between the particularity of 
revelation (viśeṣa-śāstra) attributed to the tantric scriptures (Āgamas) and 
the generality of revelation (sāmānya-śāstra) attributed to the Vedas and 
orthodox scriptures (Flood 2006: 63). According to this view, the more 
esoteric and, therefore, particular is the revelation transmitted only to 
the initiates, the higher it is on the scale of a graded hierarchy and, thus, 
closer to the truth. On the other hand, the more general and easily acces-
sible is the revelation, the lower it is on the scale and further removed 
from the truth (ibid.). There existed, thus, a hierarchy of different levels 
of discourse within which tantric revelation took the highest place. 
This hierarchy, based on the principle of inclusion, was projected onto 
the tantric conduct sanctioning a multi-layered personality of a tantric 
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adept. Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE), Kashmiri philosopher and 
tantric master, makes an oft-quoted remark ‘that externally one follows 
vedic practice, in the domestic sphere one is an orthodox Śaiva, but in 
one’s secret life one is follower of the extreme, antinomian cult of the 
Kula which involves disruption of the Vedas through ritual transgression 
of Vedic norms and practices’ (ibid.: 21). The tantric adept acts out differ-
ent lives, which can be classifi ed as the public life, the domestic life and 
the secret life, and in doing so he literally embodies different levels of 
discourse arranged in a graded array, from the most exoteric to the most 
esoteric. Again, Abhinavagupta conclusively justifi es the superiority of 
tantric scriptures (Āgamas) over the ‘lower’ types of orthodox scriptures 
in his monumental Tantrāloka (Ta 37.1–14, ibid.: 58–59): 
[T]he scripture (āgama) should be followed in order to reach perfection. 
This perfection is achieved quickly through pursuing the teachings in 
the scriptures of the left stream (vāmaśāsana) and transcending the Vedic 
scriptures, which rest in the “womb of illusion” (māyodarasthitam). These 
scriptures lead to the highest perfection of consciousness, a perfection 
to be realised in one’s own experience (svānubhavasiddham) beyond the 
mere ritual action declared in the Veda that should be forsaken. Relying 
on Śaiva scriptures allows us to go beyond apprehension or fear (śaṅkā) 
characteristic of the Veda and orthodox Brāhmaṇical teachings, for the 
Śaiva teachings are their reversal (viparyaya). 
What becomes evidentially clear here is that Tantrism sought to graft 
its secret, transgressive practices onto the Brāhmaṇical principles of 
purity and control, thereby using them as an ideological background to 
establish its own legitimacy and authority. What we have here, then, is 
an attempt to, fi rst, absorb the teachings of the opponent only to reject 
them in an act of transgression. The validation for this transgression 
comes from ascribing a lower status to the teachings contained in the 
scriptural canon of the orthodoxy than to the teachings exposed in 
the tantric revelation. Among these absorptions-transgressions, one of 
the most signifi cant was tantric rediscovery of desire (kāma) to which 
Raffaele Torella takes recourse in his essay, ‘Passions and Emotions in 
the Indian Philosophical–Religious Traditions’ (Chapter 1, this volume), 
placing it at the centre of his discussion on emotions in India. In making 
such declarations, Torella follows the lead of previous scholars, such as 
Madeleine Biardeau, who claims that Tantrism is ‘an attempt to place 
kāma, desire, in every meaning of the word, in the service of liberation 
. . . not to sacrifi ce this world for liberation’s sake, but to reinstate it, 
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in varying ways, within the perspective of salvation’ (1989: 4). Torella’s 
main assertion is that the entire Indian culture has been always aware of 
the signifi cance of kāma as the storehouse of human and divine energy, 
characterised by drive dimension. The primary trigger for arousal of 
emotions has always been kāma. 
In the Bhagavadgītā 3.37, Arjuna asks Lord Kṛṣṇa about the trigger 
that prompts man’s engagement in a wrong activity. Kṛṣṇa replies: ‘It 
is desire indeed, which, being obstructed, becomes anger that prompts 
man thus’. The main point of Kṛṣṇa’s reply is that desire is closely 
related to the emotional structure of human beings. All emotions are 
perpetuated by desire to prolong pleasure and escape pain. The desire 
to be united with the object of pleasure results in attachment (rāga); on 
the contrary, the desire to avoid an object of pain results in repulsion 
(dveṣa). The frustration of the object of desire leads to anger, longing, 
etc. In this context, the Bhagavadgītā and Manusmṛti declare kāma to be 
the insatiable consumer (mahāśana). In the Manusmṛti, it is said that ‘kāma 
is recurrent even after its fulfi llment, just as ghee poured as oblation 
in fi re makes the fl ame rise higher and higher’ (Manusmṛti 2.94, in Rao 
2011: 418–20). The very nature of desire is wanting something, longing 
for something, being anxious for something. This thirst (tṛṣṇā) for the 
objects of perception is inherently present in desire. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
Upaniṣad (4.4.7, in Witz 1998: 74), it is said that the man (puruṣa) con-
sists only of desire; this desire determines one’s conduct through life 
prompting good and evil actions (karma) that are based on attachment, 
greed, etc., that ultimately result in saṃsāra. The way out of saṃsāra is 
an attainment of a ‘desireless state’. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (4.4.9, 
ibid.: 75) further says: ‘When all desires are expelled, which lurk within 
his heart, then a mortal becomes immortal; he attains the Brahman 
here (in this world)’. The transcendence of desire that consequently 
led to emotional deprivation has become a crucial aspect of spiritual 
perfection in the Brāhmaṇical tradition, but the precise way in which 
it was actually accomplished needs to noted here. As Flood (2006: 47) 
points out, pleasure (kāma) shaped social values and meanings within 
the dhārmic system of human goals of life (puruṣārthas) and, in a way, 
constituted a normative rule to which every Brāhmaṇa found himself 
committed. In accordance with the implicit norms of belief and conduct 
imposed by the Brāhmaṇical purity-bound mentality, founded on the 
renunciation of desire and the denial of body–emotions–mind–senses 
complex, liberation (mokṣa) was antithetical to pleasure (kāma). 
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This tension between the confl icting values within the tradition ‘was 
resolved through the institution of the stages of life (āśrama), where 
mokṣa was left to the renouncer’ and itself relegated to the last stage of 
human life. Another example of a skilful resolution of this confl ict within 
the Brāhmaṇical tradition is the Bhagavadgītā. The Bhagavadgītā with its 
spiritual ideal of a karmayogin incorporated the troubled notion of ‘desire’ 
into the fi eld of action (karma), promoting unattached, selfl ess activity 
of the ‘desireless action’ (niṣkāma karma). The desire-motivated actions 
(sakāma karma) were depreciated; on the other hand, those actions that 
were unmotivated by desire (niṣkāma karma) became dignifi ed. The 
ideal of the Bhagavadgītā effectively destroyed the primal motivating 
force that stood behind all human activities in the world and gave rise 
to the ‘detached performance of an act’ (Krishnan 1989: 177). Torella 
incorporates this idea as the starting point of his argument claiming 
that Tantrism replaced the ‘desireless action’ of the Bhagavadgītā with 
a spiritual ideal of a pure ‘desiring condition’ without any object or 
action (niṣkarma kāma). In Tantrism, the pure ‘desiring condition’ is 
both a goal and a path leading towards liberation. Rather than escap-
ing ‘desire’ that arouses emotions and passions, Tantrism encourages 
the fullest engagement in the emotional states and passions that act 
as a direct link connecting with the infi nite potential energy that lies 
behind them. In this way, Tantrism reacted against what it regarded as 
a lower and limited revelation of the dhārmic renunciation of desire. 
While reinstating the strictly avoided notion of desire into its system of 
practice, Tantrism sanctioned the transgression of conventional norms 
of the Brāhmaṇical dharma. According to Torella, this reinstatement of 
desire enabled Tantrism to assign value to the body, senses and, thus, to 
emotions that became equally appropriated as the means of liberation 
(mokṣa). The major contribution of Tantrism, relatively unknown to 
earlier philosophies and religious systems, was actually constituted by 
a great importance attached in this system to the human body bloom-
ing with a dazzling array of emotions and passions. The intensity of 
emotional experience became incorporated into tantric yoga practice. 
This theme is explored by Bettina Bäumer in her essay, ‘Intensity 
of Emotions: A Way of Liberation in the Advaita Śaiva Āgamas and 
Their Exegetes’ (Chapter 2, this volume). She starts her argument 
from the premise that the standard paradigm of Indian spirituality 
was formulated upon the suppression of citta (the body–mind–emo-
tions complex). In making this claim, she refers to the Pātañjala Yoga’s 
famous statement: ‘Yoga is the suppression of psychosomatic states’ 
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(yogaś-citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ). The tantric yoga, better known as the means 
of realisation (upāya), apparently developed against the self-control 
of a classical Pātañjala Yoga as its exact opposition. Surveying textual 
examples from the tantric yoga manuals, such as the Vijñānabhairava 
and the Spandakārikā, Bäumer shows to what extent emotions have been 
appropriated into yogic practice of Tantrism. The most fascinating issue 
she brings out in her exposition is the tantric absorption of the yogic 
notion of one-pointedness (ekāgratā) that becomes positively reformu-
lated in the tantric practice. According to Vyāsa’s commentary on the 
Yoga Sūtra (YK 1.1, in Āraṇya 1963: 2–5), citta habitually abides in fi ve 
states. Of these, the fi rst is ‘distraught’ (kṣipta), in which neither patience 
nor concentration of citta is possible; the second is ‘stupefaction’ (muḍha), 
in which citta is obsessed with one thought, i.e., the thought of family or 
wealth; the third is ‘restlessness’ (vikṣipta), in which citta is sometimes 
calm and sometimes disturbed; the fourth is ‘one-pointedness’, in which 
citta holds to one thought, whether in dream or in the awakened state; 
the fi fth is ‘suppression’ (niruddha), in which different psychosomatic 
states of citta are shut out. The Pātañjala Yoga distinguishes between two 
types of samādhi that correspond to the fourth and the fi fth condition 
of citta respectively: (a) samprajñāta-samādhi, which is attained by the 
mastery of one-pointedness; and (b) asamprajñāta-samādhi, which is the 
state of total cessation of citta, ensuring liberation (kaivalya). According 
to the precepts of the Yoga Sūtra, restless citta can never develop con-
centration leading to liberation. Only citta that develops a lasting one-
pointedness (ekāgratā) is secure in reaching the state of liberation. In the 
state of one-pointedness, the restlessness of citta that sets in when one 
is happy, unhappy or stupefi ed is diminished. In the one-pointed state 
of concentration, the feelings and emotions are gradually eliminated, 
and, therefore, this state directly leads to the suppression of citta, and, 
thus, to liberation (ibid.). In tantric yoga, on the other hand, the state 
of one-pointed concentration does not entail the removal of emotions, 
but, on the contrary, the fullest engagement in their power. The tantric 
texts, referred to by Bäumer in her essay, describe yogic practices that 
advocate one-pointed concentration on the various intense emotional 
states of anger, desire, greed, delusion, intoxication, and envy, in which 
the bliss of consciousness alone arises. She rightly points out that the 
tantric incorporation of emotions into its system of yogic practice 
depends mainly on the emotion’s inherent intensity. Only in the states 
of extreme anger, great fear, or intense joy, all other mental movements 
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come to stop, and the yogins become one-pointed in the experience of 
spanda (the experience of the Absolute). 
Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the tantric critique of 
Pātañjala Yoga, directed against the suppression of emotions belonging 
to citta. In tantric understanding, emotions are direct means for citta’s 
transformation. When citta becomes one-pointed through its engage-
ment in the powerful emotional states, she gives up the limited tendency 
of extroversion and becomes introverted, then the aspect of limitation 
that normally contracts her, becomes dissolved and she becomes trans-
formed into cit (universal consciousness) (Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam 13, in 
Singh 1977: 86). In Tantrism, citta is not to be suppressed, but transformed 
into highest consciousness. This transformation is enacted through yogic 
practice that advocates total immersion in the emotional states. Another 
important point Bäumer brings out in her discussion on emotions in 
India is the notion of kṣobha in the sense of ‘restlessness’, ‘agitation’, or 
‘excitement’. What sets the tantric kṣobha apart from its earlier forms 
developed in the Sāṃkhya–Yoga is its tangible association with yogic, 
aesthetic and emotional levels of experience. The Sāṃkhya–Yoga’s atti-
tude to ‘restlessness’ is entirely negative. The restlessness of citta should 
be suppressed in a yogic concentration, for she is a negative result of 
creation brought about by disturbance (kṣobha).14 For the Buddhists, who 
enumerate 10 stages that obstruct the peace of mind along the way to 
fi nal emancipation (nirvāṇa), ‘excitement’ or ‘agitation’ occupies the 
ninth place and, therefore, requires elimination. In Tantrism, however, 
kṣobha, like desire (kāma), acts as a stimulus for the activation of emotions 
that arise in connection with agitation caused by vital energy present 
in the body. For an experienced tantric yogin, the agitation of the vital 
energy (vīryakṣobha) that occurs in the middle channel of suṣumnā15 is 
fully responsible for aesthetic-cum-spiritual experience of camatkāra 
(wonder, astonishment). All the sensory experiences and emotional 
states, whether negative or positive, which are also the form of agita-
tion (kṣobhātmakam), can become the source of camatkāra when they are 
recognised in harmony with the creative excitement taking place within 
the Absolute. This excitement caused by the sensory experiences or 
emotional states should not be suppressed but cultivated, for it acts as a 
trigger for the arousal of the vital energy in the yogic body culminating 
in the aesthetic-cum-spiritual experience of camatkāra.
The portrayal of Tantrism as a primarily transgressive movement 
going against the Brāhmaṇical norms of purity and control is best rep-
resented in the essay by Aleksandra Wenta, ‘Between Fear and Heroism: 
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The Tantric Path to Liberation’ (Chapter 3, this volume). Basing her 
main argument on Alexis Sanderson’s famous dialectics of purity and 
power in which the division is established between those who seek 
depersonalised purity (Brāhmaṇas) and those who seek omnipotence 
through the transgression of powerless orthopraxy (Tāntrikas), she 
shows how the logic of this dialectics can be extended even to include the 
sphere of emotions. Her assumption is that the Brāhmaṇical obsession 
with purity logically entailed such psychological predicates as fear of 
contamination. On the basis of this premise, she claims that the tantric 
path is characterised by a direct face-to-face confrontation with this 
very fear that was radically avoided in the Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy. It 
turns out that Tantrism consciously and overtly modelled itself upon 
those ideas that were intolerable to the orthodoxy. The transgressive 
character of the tantric movement can be seen, once again, in the 
absorption of the orthodox ideas that are deliberately being subverted 
by stressing its limited degree of truth. Wenta’s argument is consis-
tent with claims regarding ‘Brāhmaṇical fear’ expounded by tantric 
authors, such as Abhinavagupta or his commentator Jayaratha. In his 
Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta says that ‘relying on Śaiva scriptures allows 
us to go beyond apprehension or fear (śaṅkā) characteristic of the Veda 
and orthodox Brāhmaṇical teachings, for the Śaiva teachings are their 
reversal (viparyaya)’ (Tā 37.1–14, in Flood 2006: 58–59). In a similar man-
ner, Jayaratha conspicuously declares that ‘those practitioners who do 
not do what is forbidden due to fear experience a thousand torments in 
hell’ (Tā 29.99–100a and Jayaratha’s commentary, ibid.: 112). The dec-
laration that tantric practice is justifi ed by appeal to do anything that 
is forbidden and feared in the orthopraxy is, without doubt, a powerful 
statement of Tantrism. Wenta’s essay takes us on a journey to this ‘for-
bidden land’, comprised of fear-eliciting places, substances and deities 
wherein tantric confrontation with the deep-rooted ‘Brāhmaṇical fear’ 
takes place. In Tantrism, this fear is personalised and sacralised, becom-
ing a deity, Bhairava. It was in confrontation with the ‘Brāhmaṇical fear’ 
that the tantric path of heroism (vīra-sādhanā) emerged, trespassing the 
boundaries of impure and pure imposed by the Brāhmaṇical worldview. 
The path of heroism was conceptually grounded in the wider practice of 
non-duality (advaitācāra), according to which the dualistic perception 
that causes fear (characteristic to the orthodoxy) is considered to be 
the enemy which must be destroyed and supplanted with the vision of 
non-duality of the Self, wherein all opposites merge in oneness.
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The Bhakti Movement
In the beginning of his exposition on bhakti, R. C. Zaehner (1962: 164) 
recalls the famous episode from the Mahābhārata, in which the righ-
teous king Yudhiṣṭhira is refused entry into heaven with his beloved 
dog by the gods of the Brāhmaṇical pantheon. The dog, says Zaehner, 
is an exemplar of a true bhakta, ‘devoted, loyal creature’, and Indra is 
forced to reprove Yudhiṣṭhira ‘for still being subject to human love, for 
in mokṣa, there is no love’. Yudhiṣṭhira protests and refuses to enter the 
gates of heaven without his beloved pet. This single image is enough to 
capture the central feature of the Bhakti movement that opposed the 
Brāhmaṇical ideal of emotionlessness, an ideal that Brāhmaṇism shared 
with Buddhism and Jainism. The Bhakti movement had its origins in 
the works espoused by the Vaiṣṇava Āḷvārs (‘those immersed in God’)16 
(6th–9th century CE) and the Śaiva Nāyaṉārs (5th–10th century CE) and 
rose into importance in mediaeval Tamil Nadu, wherefrom it began to 
spread quickly to the north, especially in the late medieval period when 
India was struggling under Turkish invasions. Bhakti protagonists, who 
were traditionally called ‘saints’, ‘elaborated [an] egalitarian doctrine 
that transcended the Brāhmaṇical caste system and encouraged indi-
viduals to seek personal union with the divine’ (Bentley 1993: 120). 
The most appealing aspect of Bhakti movement was that it assisted the 
development of a religiously motivated affective life, in which emotions 
came to be seen not as unwelcome obstructions for spiritual growth but 
as the very medium through which this growth and transformation were 
ensured. In its emphasis on intense emotionalism, the Bhakti movement 
reacted against ‘cold’ traditions of Brāhmaṇism, Buddhism and Jainism 
that propagated the ascetic ideal of world-renouncer. In the words of 
Kamil Zvelebil (1973: 199): 
[I]n comparison with the decayed, deteriorated Southern Buddhism 
and Jainism we see in the Tamil Hindu revival [of bhakti] the triumph of 
emotion over intellect, of the concrete over the abstract, of the acceptance 
of life over its ascetic denial, of something near and homely against 
something alien and distant, and, above all, the acceptance of positive 
love against cold morality or intellectually coloured compassion. 
Even though, it is certainly true that the richness of emotional life 
played a very important role in bhakti, one should not understand from 
it that the emotionalism of bhakti was all about uncritical emotions. 
As Karen Pechilis Prentiss (1999: 20) declares in her excellent study on 
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Tamil Śiva-bhakti tradition, bhakti is ‘committed engagement’ that, on 
the one hand, involves emotional dedication, but, on the other, also 
makes a space for a critical refl ection directed against the ascetic ideal 
promulgated by ‘cold’ traditions; such criticism usually belongs to the 
sphere of intellect. From this premise, she constructs her argument that 
defi nes bhakti as a ‘theology of embodiment’ (Prentiss 1999: 6), which 
implies participation in God (bhakti, derived from Sanskrit verbal root 
bhaj, meaning ‘to participate’). Such participation in God is meant to 
include all aspects of human activity in the world, in a sense in which a 
bhakta is expected to devote his whole being to God, refl ecting upon Him 
with his mind and heart (interestingly, ‘mind’ and ‘heart’ are linguisti-
cally expressed by the same Sanskrit-derived word in Tamil, maṉam) 
(ibid.: 53). It appears, then, that the emotionalism of bhakti should not 
be reduced to the sphere of feelings, to the exclusion of everything else, 
for the active participation in God, redefi ned as a ‘theology of embodi-
ment’, seems to have cognitive overtones as well. In this context, it 
must be emphasised that emotional involvement of a bhakta inheres in 
a certain cognitive dynamism, in which his ‘mind’ and his ‘heart’ are 
equally approximating the presence of God. 
The Bhakti movement’s disagreement with the ascetic traditions 
of Buddhism and Jainism was on two grounds. First, the metaphysical 
attitude towards reality, which was no longer to be denied but rather 
appreciated as the manifestation of a theistic God, was enshrined in a 
concrete temple. Second, the worship of God had an ecstatic character 
that clearly contrasted with the ‘cold’ practices of self-denial embedded 
in the spiritual ideal of world-renouncer. To a great extent, the ecstatic 
type of bhakti worship relied upon a total psychophysical engagement 
of a bhakta expressed in his singing, dancing and weeping which Indira 
Peterson (1991: 42–43) has called ‘spontaneous, unstructured ways of 
worship’. Scholars specialising in Tamil Śiva-bhakti (Zvelebil 1973: 197; 
Yocum 1973: 4–11) point out that the motifs of ecstatic dancing, singing 
and weeping recur in bhakti poems in the context of a bhakta’s ‘emotional 
outpouring of love to God’ (Yocum 1973: 4). The emotional response 
signifi ed by the feeling of love towards God became the central motif 
of bhakti poetry. The worship inspired by this intense love drove affec-
tive expressions, i.e., shedding tears, dancing and singing. This type of 
worship was effectively comingled with religious experience that the 
Tamil saints called ‘melting of one’s own heart and mind in love for God 
(ullam uruku)’ (ibid.).
The essay by T. Ganesan, ‘Principal Emotions Contributing to the 
Supreme Love of Śiva: A Study of Early Śaiva Hymnal Corpus’ (Chapter 4, 
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this volume), explores the emotionalism of bhakti primarily in the 
context of Tamil Śiva-bhakti tradition extending back to the earliest 
saints (nāyaṉār), known as ‘the three’ (mūvar), viz., Tiruñāṉacampantar 
(Campantar), Tirunāvukkaracar (Appar), and Cuntaramūrti (Nampi 
Ārūrar), who lived between 7th and 9th centuries CE. Their works, collec-
tively called the Tēvāram (Tamil teva ‘god’, aram ‘garland’), is a collection 
of fi rst seven volumes of the Tirumurai, the 12-volume anthology of the 
Tamil Śaiva devotional songs which were defi ned as a canon during 
the reign of Cōla king Rājarāja I. Among the other authors of Tirumurai 
anthology, Ganesan takes recourse to Mānikkavācakar’s 9th-century-CE 
works, which constitute the eighth volume of the Tirumurai; saint-
poetess Kāraikkāl Ammaiyar’s 6th-century-CE poems, which constitute 
the eleventh volume of the Tirumurai); and Cēkkiḻār’s 12th-century-CE 
hagiography of Tamil Śaiva saints, the Periyapurāṇam, which constitutes 
the twelfth volume of the Tirumurai. In the devotional hymns of the 
Tamil Śaiva saints, subjectivity, visibly foregrounded in the fi rst-person 
narrator, takes on increasing importance. Prentiss (1999: 44) claims: 
‘[T]he Tamil hymns appear to be the fi rst in Hindu literature to use the 
fi rst person singular voice, conveying that the author is speaking from 
experience’. The fi rst person narrations are very personal reports, fi rmly 
grounded in the experiential and emotional hardships of daily life. Since 
the poems were written from the standpoint of existential troubles of a 
bhakta, they could be more instructive and accessible to the wider Tamil 
Śaiva community because they taught about human condition, providing 
stories and images from daily life. Often, the tone of these poems is bit-
ter, as it arises from an emphasis on the ‘human inadequacy’ (ibid.: 50). 
In addition to such reports of existential trials and inner struggle, the 
poems provide accessibility to a whole spectrum of emotions carrying 
with themselves an explosive mixture of impulsiveness, love, joy, sorrow, 
heroism, frustration, self-repentance, intense longing, anger, awe, and 
disgust. In some instances, God is overtly criticised by a bhakta through 
harsh speech; this estrangement from God is a sign of his intimacy with 
Him (ibid.: 67). In his essay, Ganesan tracks a great variety of emotional 
meanings that have enormous devotional power. It is defi nitely this 
emotional dramatisation itself that provides the experience of participa-
tion in the praise of Śiva that, in a signifi cant part, predicates God’s total 
accessibility. Access to God, arising from emotional involvement, is not 
exclusively limited to the poets; the audience, too, could participate in 
their emotions. In his adaption of the classical rasa theory of aesthetics, 
Norman Cutler (1987) argues that the Tamil Śaiva hymns could provide 
the audience with rasa-like experience if the poem is ‘reincarnated’ in 
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the psyche of the audience. Anthony G. Harris (2008: 37) summarises 
Cutler’s ‘reincarnation theory’ in the following words: 
In a ritual context, the audience must be receptive to the emotion in the 
poem. In this way, the audience (in a ritual context) can “reincarnate” the 
original context of the hymn because, by nature, the hymn is not bound 
to a historical context, in the sense that, say, a classical Tamil poem on 
kingship is. But the bhakti poem has the ability to migrate through space 
and time if the audience is willing to serve as a psychological vessel for 
its reincarnation; and this also happens with a total identifi cation with 
the poet. 
The most pervasive human emotion that shapes an intimate relation-
ship between the devotee and his personal God is love, which assumes 
myriad aspects, among which ‘fi lial love’ and ‘erotic love’ become the 
most prominent. Defi ning Cuntaramūrti’s poetry, Zvelebil (1973: 203) 
points out that it is ‘close to erotic lyrics intimately connected 
with his innermost emotions . . . with the body of the Beloved’. On 
Mānikkavācakar’s poems, he says: ‘[T]he love of the devotee which is 
central . . . is responded to by the object of worship with divine grace 
(aṛuḻ)’ (ibid.: 204). Stylistically, the Tamil Śaiva hymns were projected 
onto the landscape of the akam genre of the ancient Tamil Caṅkam poetry 
communicating different types of love relationship. In some poems, the 
aspect of physical separation between the lovers that adds to their suf-
fering becomes visibly pronounced. In other instances, the poet-saint 
takes on the form of a young maiden emotionally overwhelmed by the 
unconditional love for her hero. The impact of this emotion is undeni-
able when, against all conventions, she leaves her parental home in 
search for her lover. Ganesan illustrates in his essay that this intense 
love for God is often ‘blind’ insomuch as it involves extreme and harsh 
behaviour, including self-infl iction and injury — something that can be 
seen as voicing approval of religious extremism. Another interesting 
trend of the Tamil Śiva-bhakti poems is the one in which the bhakta is 
portrayed as a slave or a servant (toṇṭar) of God. Some scholars opine 
that it was, in fact, the lord–servant relationship existing at the nucleus 
of the feudal society that became reduplicated into the deity–devotee 
relationship in bhakti tradition. The devotee very often addresses the 
deity as the lord or the master, placing himself in a relation of affective 
subordination to the lord-deity, in the position of a slave. The recurrent 
theme of bhakti poetry is ‘bondage’, understood as the highest objective 
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in life, more desirable than wealth or liberation. Thus, viewed through 
the prism of bhakti ideology, the feudalistic hierarchy of the mediaeval 
period became idealised and romanticised. The slavery and servitude 
became sublimated through the emotional appeal of bhakti (Narayanan 
and Veluthat 1978: 51–54). 
The Bhakti movement that originated in Tamil Nadu spread to 
north India in the late mediaeval period. While the southern move-
ment proclaimed its devotion to Śiva or Viṣṇu, the northern movement 
favoured Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, the incarnations of Viṣṇu. During the 14th–17th 
centuries CE, the northern stream of the Bhakti movement gathered 
around various saint-teachers, among whom Caitanya Mahāprabhu 
(1486–1524 CE), a saint from eastern India, initiated the Bengali Caitanya 
Vaiṣṇava tradition. Caitanya was regarded as the embodiment of a 
sublime erotic love (śṛṅgāra) between Lord Kṛṣṇa and his lover Rādhā, 
and his arrival on the earth was already prophesied in the Bhāgavata 
Purāṇa, the main scriptural authority of the Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism. He left 
no writings; therefore, the task of systematising the tradition was left 
to his disciples who came to be known as the Six Gosvāmins. Of these, 
Rūpa Gosvāmin (early 16th century CE) is considered to be the one who 
established the theoretical foundations of the Bengali Vaiṣṇavism. Rūpa 
Gosvāmin’s contribution to the aestheticisation of bhakti is of enormous 
importance. He is the one who appropriated the entire structure and 
terminology of Bharata’s rasa theory into his ‘aesthetics of bhakti’ or 
bhakti-rasa — a relatively new phenomenon in mediaeval India. As Donna 
M. Wulff (1986: 683) summarises: ‘His [Rūpa Gosvāmin’s] conception of 
devotion is a fundamentally aesthetic one, in which the development 
of bhakti toward the Lord involves a gradual refi ning and intensifying 
of emotion through repeated encounters with the eternal drama of 
Krishna and his close associates in Vraja’. Rūpa Gosvāmin’s ‘aesthetics 
of bhakti’ was undoubtedly infl uenced by Abhinavagupta’s theory of 
aesthetics expounded in the Abhinavabhāratī, a commentary on Bharata’s 
Nāṭyaśāstra. Nevertheless, Rūpa introduced a number of important 
changes to both Abhinavagupta’s and Bharata’s theories of aesthetics. 
For this reason, it is plausible to claim that his conception of bhakti-rasa 
was a truly innovative contribution to the aesthetic transfi guration of the 
Bhakti movement.17 The Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition that fl ourished in 
Bengal from 16th to 19th centuries CE is regarded as the tantric offshoot 
of the Bengali Caitanya Vaiṣṇavism. 
The essay by Neal Delmonico and Aditi Nath Sarkar, ‘Love Never 
Tasted Quite Like This Before: Śṛṅgāra-rasa in the Light of Two Texts 
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from a Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava Notebook’ (Chapter 5, this volume), is dedi-
cated to the Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition, which asserted itself more 
clearly against the institution of Brāhmaṇas as the ritual specialists 
and the ‘corruption’ of Buddhism. The Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇavism rejected 
the Brāhmaṇical caste system and intrinsic rigidity of the Brāhmaṇical 
forms of worship in favour of innate spontaneity (sahaja) which ‘applied 
to a system of worship and belief in which the natural qualities of the 
senses should be used, not denied or suppressed’ (Dimock 1991: 20–22). 
Cultivation of spontaneity was propagated through forms of worship 
that gave rise to the expansion of senses, expressed in dancing and sing-
ing. This performative type of worship was, in itself, a part of immedi-
ate communion with the divine ‘which they [the Sahajiyās] have also 
conceptualised as the very essence (rasa) of devotion or love (bhakti)’ 
(Feuerstein 1998: 234). The notion of rasa as the essence of religious 
devotion, in which the senses and the mind–body complex are totally 
immersed in Kṛṣṇa, constitutes the crux of Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradi-
tion (Dimock 1991: 20–22). The essay by Delmonico and Sarkar shows 
to what extent the emotions experienced in bhakti contribute to the 
praxial modes of religious being-in-the-world. Becoming emotion, or in 
this context becoming śṛṅgāra rasa, carries with itself onto-behavioural 
signature directed towards the construction of the embodied and 
enacted mode of religious identity. In the Sahajiyā Vaiṣṇava tradition, 
a dynamic construction of religious identity is highlighted in the con-
text of achieving a sublime, erotically charged emotion, personifi ed by 
Rādhikā, Kṛṣṇa’s lover. Sharing in Rādhikā’s emotional experience of 
sublime erotic love for Kṛṣṇa plays a pioneering role in the develop-
ment of a religious persona or identity, expressed metaphorically as the 
‘fl owering bud identity’ (mañjarī-svarūpa). Moreover, such an emotional 
involvement is a medium of psychophysical transfi guration, engender-
ing a complete transformation of both body and consciousness resulting 
in the divinisation of the body–mind–emotions complex. This complete 
transfi guration is additionally enacted through tantric-cum-alchemical 
practices in which rasa, the immortal nectar, is produced and sustained.
Buddhism, Jainism, Pātañjala Yoga, and Śaiva Siddhānta
Buddhism18 and Jainism19 were the two almost contemporary Śrāmaṇic 
movements that originated in the Greater Magadha, the north-eastern 
region of India in around 5th–6th century BCE. Both systems’ philosophic 
views had grown out of a reaction against the Brāhmaṇical forms of 
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ritualism (especially against the animal sacrifi ces which they regarded 
as an example of cruelty) and against caste system.20 Scholars gener-
ally agree that these two socio-religious movements were aware of 
each other’s existence, a fact that can be attested by Buddha’s polemics 
directed against Jainism (Bronkhorst 1993; Gombrich 1994). Although 
divergent from one another in their ontologies and epistemologies, 
they generally shared the same negative valuation of human existence, 
which they regarded as being exclusively the source of suffering (Pāli: 
dukkha, Sanskrit: duḥkha). In both systems, this ‘suffering’ constituted 
a negative affective dimension of human existence and, therefore, gave 
them a more pressing reason to pursue ascetic practice, thanks to which 
one could alleviate it. In Jainism, the suffering was a result of an activity 
(Pāli: kamma, Skt: karma), hence its strong emphasis on the practice of 
becoming motionless as the means to eradicate it. One of the earliest 
Jaina texts, the Āyāraṃga (Skt: Ācārāṅga Sūtra 1.3.1.3–4, in Bronkhorst 
2007: 17–18) says: ‘[K]nowing that all this suffering is born from activity’; 
‘no action is found in him who has abandoned activity, the condition [for 
rebirth] originates on account of activity’. The Jainas visualised karma as 
a kind material substance, a moist dirt that ‘fl ows in’ (Pāli: avassava, Skt: 
āsava) on the soul and sticks to it. The path to liberation lay in expunging 
(Pāli: nijjarā, Skt: nirjarā) karma through asceticism that involved the total 
restraint of the body–mind–emotions complex. The Jaina stress on the 
ideal of inactivity had at its aim the wearing out of the old karma and the 
freedom from future karma which was accomplished by the suspension 
of all activities. As a result, says the Cūla Dukkha-kkhandha Sutta, ‘[this] 
wearing out of their karma [led] in turn to the wearing out of their suf-
fering, that to the wearing out of sensation (vedanā), and that to the 
expunging of all suffering’ (Gombrich 1994: 1089–90). This manner of 
coming to terms with the painful agony of human existence led the Jaina 
monks to undertake extreme ascetic practices, such as a ritual of death by 
fasting (sallekhanā), in which ‘the monk abstains from food and prepares 
for death in a position which is as motionless as possible’ (Bronkhorst 
2007: 18). It seems, then, that in the Jaina rigorous practice, there was 
no place left for emotions, except maybe for the misery of suffering that 
one was told to expunge through practices that rested on the principle 
of inactivity. Upon investigating the ideological framework of early 
Buddhism, one comes to the conclusion that the inclination towards the 
pessimistic outlook of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ — (a) ‘there is suffering’; 
(b) its ‘cause’; (c) its ‘cessation’; and (d) the ‘path leading to cessation’ — 
revealed by the Buddha emerged from the surrounding cultural milieu 
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of ascetic denial. The fi rst Noble Truth, ‘there is suffering’, constituted a 
powerful statement of the Buddha’s teachings, especially when coupled 
with the view that the entire realm of becoming which is additionally 
conceived as impermanent (Pāli: anicca, Skt: anitya) and not the self (Pāli: 
anatta, Skt: anātmā) is situated within a dynamic philosophical framework 
of dependent origination (Pāli: paṭccasamuppāda, Skt: pratītya-samutpāda). 
Thus, as Richard F. Gombrich (1996: 33) remarks: ‘[W]hat gives the fi rst 
noble truth its emotional force is its application to human life and 
the remainder that that always ends in death’. In accordance with the 
second Noble Truth, it was ‘craving’, ‘thirst’ (Pāli: taṇhā, Skt: tṛṣṇā) that 
was a necessarily affi rmed primary cause of suffering. In the etiology of 
emotions expounded by the Buddha, ‘thirst’ was a primarily drive that 
stood behind all the passions, desires and emotional reactions caused by 
the sensory experience. The path to Enlightenment, thus, entailed the 
elimination of ‘thirst’. However, unlike the case in Jainism, in Buddhism 
this elimination was not dependent on the total immobilisation of the 
body–mind–emotions complex, but rather on a set of psychological 
practices closely related to the ‘virtue ethics’. 
In his essay, ‘The Buddhist Psychology of Emotions’ (Chapter 6, this 
volume), Varun Kumar Tripathi makes a penetrating analysis of the con-
cepts that contribute to our understanding of emotions in the Buddhist 
system of thought and practice. His analysis begins with the exposition 
of the three constituent roots of emotional disorders originating from 
‘thirst’ or ‘craving’: (a) ‘passion’ or ‘attachment’ (rāga); (b) ‘hatred’ or 
‘repulsion’ (dveṣa); and (c) ‘delusion’ (moha). These three are known as 
the ‘three roots of evil’ or ‘the three fi res’ that have to be blown out 
(Pāli: nibbāna, Skt: nirvāṇa) like a fl ame. According to Gombrich (1996: 
65; cf. Gombrich 2006), the Buddha introduced the metaphor of ‘the 
three fi res’ of passion, hatred and delusion in the third sermon, the 
Āditta-pariyāya (‘The way of putting things as being on fi re’), as an open 
critique of the Brāmaṇical orthopraxy of sacrifi ce. In discussing ‘the 
three fi res’ metaphor, the Buddha claimed that everything, including the 
fi ve sense faculties, the sense objects and the feelings, are afl ame with 
passion, hatred and delusion (Gombrich 1996: 66). While the fi rst two, 
‘passion’ and ‘hatred’, belong to the affective dimension of human being, 
the third one, ‘delusion’ is a form of ignorance (Pāli: avijjā, Skt: avidyā) 
that belongs to the cognitive dimension. In the psychology rendered 
by early Buddhism, then, cognitions are collocated with emotions: ‘you 
cannot see things straight because you are blinded by passion, and you 
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allow your emotions to run you, because you do not see things as they 
are. The false view that feeds the emotions is that there is an eternal 
self’ (Gombrich 2006: 67). As a result, says Gombrich (ibid.: 65), ‘nibbāna 
[concomitant with Enlightenment] is not a “thing” but the experience 
of being without greed, hatred and delusion’. Among the most impor-
tant delusions enumerated in the Buddha’s teachings are the following: 
(a) taking ‘permanent as impermanent’; (b) taking ‘impure as pure’; 
(c) taking ‘suffering as pleasure’; and (d) taking ‘non-self as self’. These 
delusions give rise to attachment, desire, repugnance, hatred, etc. The 
path leading to nibbāna is purely psychological insofar as it involves 
the cultivation of mindfulness on the essential impermanence of all 
things: ‘by being aware of his own physique, feelings, states of mind 
and thoughts the Buddhist will cease to identify with them as his self, 
to introject a sense of ego into what are but transient phenomena, con-
stantly coming into being and passing away’ (ibid.). Through mindful-
ness arise non-attachment, non-repugnance, tolerance, patience, etc. 
Another interesting way of analysing emotions in the Buddhist context, 
as expounded by Tripathi, comes from ‘virtue ethics’ (mostly derived 
from the 5th-century-CE Buddhist scholar Buddhaghoṣa), which, indeed, 
is identical with a continued effort at self-development and annihilation 
of negative ‘infl ows’ of emotional traits (āsava). The term āsava was taken 
by the Buddhists from Jainism to refer to the emotional predispositions 
of a person that were effectively cultivated or nourished by ignorance-
cum-delusion. According to the logic of paṭccasamuppāda, the emotions 
were not fi xed states but rather cultivated transitory moments derived 
from ignorance, and as such they could be de-cultivated through the 
process of nourishment of suitable counter-virtues. Therefore, certain 
emotional traits that were believed to have a cognitive component as 
well could be pragmatically utilised to develop suitable counter-virtues. 
For example, a person in whom passion (rāga) was predominant could 
begin to practise virtues, such as service or right faith. It was ascertained 
that these negative emotional traits could be removed through their 
replacement by positive emotional traits. The nourishment of suitable 
counter-virtues acted as a medicine which cured the ‘illness’ in a sense 
in which the negative emotional traits became completely dissolved. 
The culmination of this replacement resulted in the attainment of the 
highest ethical virtue which was compassion (karuṇā) and the highest 
intellectual virtue, i.e., wisdom (prajñā) by the Buddhists. In this view, 
the Buddhist practice can be thought of as representing the specifi c 
technique of spiritual psychotherapy, built upon working with emotions. 
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Emotions are utilised as practical tools for self-development. As Flood 
(2004: 130) remarks: ‘For Buddhaghoṣa the development of asceticism is 
fundamentally linked to the development of Buddhist virtue as a means 
for controlling desire and the senses. Not only are the higher stages of 
the path built upon virtue, they can also be strengthened by the ascetic 
practices’. An enlightened one (buddha) is emotionally unperturbed. He 
still has emotions and feelings; however, unlike the ordinary person, 
he does not act upon them, but merely observes them with a calm, 
detached distance. He is the embodiment of ethical virtues of compas-
sion and wisdom. 
The essay by Andrea Acri, ‘Between Impetus, Fear, and Disgust: Desire 
for Emancipation (saṃvega) from Early Buddhism to Pātañjala Yoga and 
Śaiva Siddhānta’ (Chapter 7, this volume), shows yet a different way in 
which the dysfunctional character of emotions is practically employed 
in the spiritual practice. Acri collected evidence for the continuity 
of conceptual development of saṃvega from early non-Brāhmaṇical 
Buddhist and Jaina ascetic milieu to the Brāhmaṇical tradition of 
Pātañjala Yoga and early Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition. In discussing 
this development, he points out that saṃvega was most probably bor-
rowed by the Brāhmaṇical tradition of the Pātañjala Yoga and early 
Śaiva Siddhānta (the Śaiva tradition adhering to the key tenets of Vedic 
teachings and Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy) from Buddhist and Jaina sources. 
The conceptual development of saṃvega is intimately tied to the assign-
ment of variant meanings expressed by it. Thus, in early Buddhism and 
Jainism, saṃvega appears to be the emotional stimulus that presupposes 
emotional perturbation, experienced as fear of or disgust for saṃsāra 
that ultimately results in a religious motivation that impels the desire 
for emancipation. The Pātañjala Yoga’s semantic fi eld of saṃvega was, 
to the great extent, formulated upon the earlier Buddhist and Jaina 
counterpart. While retaining the ‘original’ meaning of the term to 
denote a fear of or disgust for saṃsāra, the Pātañjala Yoga also ascribed 
to it different denotations, such as, ‘intensity’, employed in reference 
to the yogic practice. In conformity with this ‘new’ meaning, the yogins 
were arranged hierarchically according to the saṃvega or intensity of 
their yogic practice. Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), commentator on 
the Yoga Sūtra, goes much further in equating saṃvega with vairāgya 
in a sense of ‘detachment’ or ‘passionlessness’. Thus, it, then, appears 
that saṃvega, coupled with the semantic fi eld of vairāgya, contained 
a hint of qualifi ed perfection as something exclusive or proper to an 
excellent yogin. From the premises thus investigated, Acri comes to the 
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conclusion that the semantic fi eld of saṃvega in the Pātañjala Yoga was 
considerably extended to include the inner quality of a yogin as well. 
In this connection, an assumed meaning attached to saṃvega was not 
exclusively limited to ‘disgust’ as a motivational impulse for spiritual 
emancipation, a meaning characteristic to early Buddhism and Jainism. 
The Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition is yet another example in support of a 
conceptual development of saṃvega in which the construction of mean-
ing is tied up with the principal Śaiva Saiddhāntika’s presuppositions, 
such as the depletion of soul’s impurities (mala) and the descent of Lord’s 
grace. In this view, saṃvega, which implies a feeling of disgust for and 
fear of saṃsāra is concomitant with the Lord’s grace and love directed 
toward a Śaiva adept. As Acri points out, the Śaiva Saiddhāntika tradition 
furnishes saṃvega with a theistic dimension that is absent in the early 
Buddhist and Jaina understanding of this specifi c term. 
Aesthetics
The third tradition that facilitated emotional experience was Aesthetics 
(generally treated within a framework of the rasa theory), represented 
by the works of aesthetic theoreticians, such as Rājaśekhara (the 
9th–10th-century-CE author of Kāvyamīmāṃsā), Bharata (the legendary 
author of Nāṭyaśāstra), Ānandavardhana (the 9th-century-CE author of 
Dhvanyāloka), Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (9th century CE), Śaṅkuka (9th century CE), 
and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (9th–10th century CE), to name a few. The most 
important among them was Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE), 
who consolidated and systematised the insights of his predecessors 
into the fully-fl edged rasa theory, which is the best-known part of his 
philosophy. The rasa aesthetics developed partly under the infl uence of 
Sanskrit kāvya, ‘poetic drama’, which, in turn, constituted a vital centre 
of mediaeval courtly life in India (Ali 2006). In the context of theoreti-
cal background, the rasa aesthetics was an immediate successor of the 
‘cold’ Brāhmaṇical legacy, characterised by emotional restraint that 
was driven by ascetic denial and renunciation of desire21 (vairāgya). This 
mainstream spiritual ideal clearly infl uenced aestheticians in shaping 
their own particular form of ‘aesthetic emotionalism’ that allowed 
for the experience of ‘refi ned’ emotions (rasas) that were clearly dis-
tinguished from the ordinary emotions (bhāvas) condemned by the 
Brāhmaṇical orthodoxy. Taking as their point of departure a troubled 
notion of ‘desire’, aesthetic theoreticians built on its basis the entire 
framework of ‘aesthetic emotionalism’. Thus, even though ‘desire’ was 
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vehemently denounced and declared as the source of ‘evil’ emotions in 
virtually all spiritual traditions of India rooted in the cultural milieu of 
asceticism, in the rasa aesthetics, on the contrary, ‘desire’ was made the 
basis of an argument for satisfactory aesthetic experience. Needless to 
say, the rasa aesthetics was not concerned with a real everyday world, 
in which the emotional factors often determined conative responses, 
but with a virtual, fi ctional world, set exclusively for the spectator’s 
aesthetic ‘savour’ (rasa) or ‘relish’ (āsvāda). The spectator was partak-
ing in fi ctional reality, a mere product of creative imagination which 
he was encouraged to embrace in his sympathetic emotional response 
(sahṛdaya). The consonance of the heart (sahṛdaya) was a primary quality 
of an ideal spectator (prekṣaka, rasika).22 Sahṛdaya was characterised by 
inner openness that resulted in a sympathetic response (hṛdayasaṃvāda) 
to the work of art. This aesthetic sensibility required an acute, recep-
tive observer, whose heart and mind were pure, resembling a mirror 
and, therefore, capable of receiving all the images refl ected in them 
(Abhinavabhāratī, p. 37, in Gnoli 1968: xliv). Since its inception, however, 
the consonance of the heart was being closely related with an attitude 
of passionate-cum-emotional engagement in the world of art. An earli-
est example of a passionate spectator (anurāgin) is given in Bharata’s 
Nāṭyaśāstra (27.53–55, in Goodwin 1998: xi) when he says: ‘[O]ne who 
feels happiness at the portrayal of happiness, grief at the portrayal of 
grief, misery at the portrayal of misery: such is the spectator of drama’. 
This passage shows that the possession of an ‘emotional temperament’ 
(ibid.) was the most necessary quality of an ideal spectator.23 Similar 
emphasis on passionate character as an intrinsic feature of a good 
poet is given by Ānandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka (3.42, ibid.: 11): 
‘If the poet is a man of passion (śṛṅgārin), the world in poetry is full 
of rasa. But if he is passionless (vītarāga), that world is devoid of rasa 
altogether’. Here again, ‘passion’ in the sense of emotional sensibility 
of a poet is a determining factor responsible for endowing the poetry 
or drama with an aesthetic delight (rasa). Moreover, the aestheticised 
passion (śṛṅgāra rasa) fi gured prominently among the eight rasas listed 
in the Nāṭyaśāstra. The śṛṅgāra rasa became a dominant theme of every 
court drama or literary work24 from the 4th to 13th century CE. In the 
words of Daud Ali: ‘By the eleventh century, the sentiment of śṛṅgāra 
had become so important that the king Bhoja (r. 1011–55) in his summa 
poetica, the Śṛṅgāraprakāśa or “Light on Passion”, made it the basis of a 
superordinate experiential “sense of the self’ which encompassed not 
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only erotic love, but all the emotions and sentiments of an exalted life’ 
(2006: 209; cf. Pollock 1998: 117–92). In this way, we can see how ‘desire’, 
avoided in the Brāhmaṇical orthopraxy, was relegated to the aesthetic 
domain where it assumed a prominent place. 
The ‘aesthetic emotionalism’ promoted by the rasa aesthetics gave 
people — who were brought up in the emotionally ‘cold’ Brāhmaṇical 
environment, obsessed with taboos of purity and detachment — the 
possibility for emotional engagement in the aesthetic world, which, 
in turn, effected the ‘transcendence of affective limitations’ imposed 
by Brāhmaṇism, and allowed them to fi nally make a ‘breakthrough 
into freedom-in-feeling’ (Goodwin 1998: 8). The incorporation of ‘pas-
sion’ into the aesthetic framework of rasa aesthetics was not the only 
example of Brāhmaṇical infl uence on the development of the theory 
of aesthetics. On the other side of the spectrum, we see in the theories 
of aesthetics of the mediaeval period an attempt to reconcile with the 
Brāhmaṇical ideal of ascetic denial. As Robert E. Goodwin (1998) points 
out, kāvya (and also the theories of aesthetics that emerged from the 
Sanskrit kāvya milieu) was a refl ection of the confl icting tendencies of 
the paradigmatic worldview of Indian culture, eternally torn between a 
desire for sensual pleasure that led to emotional fulfi lment and an ascetic 
ideal of complete detachment from emotions (vairāgya).25 He elaborates 
on it in the following words:
[T]he rasika (the poet or spectator of the kāvya) was genuinely aware 
of a fundamental powerlessness vis-à-vis the transcendental authority 
fi gurally represented by the ascetic sage but diffusely present throughout 
Indian culture in guru-reverence, the vairāgya ideal, etc. There is a deep-
rooted conviction in the Indian worldview that power and insight come 
only through self-restraint, i.e., through the denial of the emotional life 
(ibid.: 154). 
Perhaps the best example of an attempt to reconcile this confl ict 
between emotionalism and ascetic denial within the theory of aesthet-
ics is the concept of śānta rasa. The śānta rasa, ‘the state of tranquil-
ity or calmness’ as the source of all other rasas, was introduced by 
Abhinavagupta as the ninth rasa to a classical list of the eight rasas. In 
holding that the culmination of aesthetic experience results in tran-
quility, Abhinavagupta, a tantric master par excellence, surprisingly 
echoes the views of the mainstream ascetic and Brāhmaṇical milieu of 
emotionlessness. However, his explanation shows greater originality, 
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even if it still exhibits the same dialectical struggle for the reconcilia-
tion of opposites that takes place between affi rmation of the emotional 
life and the vairāgya ideal. In his exposition of the śānta rasa (given in 
Chapter 7 of the Abhinavabhāratī), Abhinavagupta is very conscious of 
the pūrvapakṣa position held by Ānandavardhana: śānti that has śama (the 
absence of passion) as its sthāyibhāva (stable emotion) is an attitude of 
disgust (nirveda) towards worldly enjoyment; in the absence of passion 
which is the meaning of tṛṣṇā-kṣaya-sukha (‘pleasure is [derived from] 
destruction of desire’), śānti is a state of complete emotional detachment 
(vairāgya) that leads to mokṣa. Abhinavagupta refutes the pūrvapakṣa 
position by showing that ‘since the state śānti, as a goal of the varāgin, 
involves renunciation of emotional attachment, the rasaśānta would 
appear to be capable of being focused on any bhāva whatsoever, but 
a purely negative content, and would in effect become the emotional 
awareness of the absence of emotion!’ (Gerow and Aklujkar 1972: 82). 
The only way to avoid the pitfalls of depriving śānta rasa of its emotional 
component was to relegate its sthāyibhāva to another ontological dimen-
sion. In this view, the sthāyibhāva of śānta rasa became ātman itself or, in 
other words, the aesthetic experience of the pure Self.
The essay by D. Venkat Rao, ‘Moha Kāla: Aporia of Emotion in Indian 
Refl ective Traditions’ (Chapter 8, this volume), shows the paradoxical 
nature of Indian traditions, eternally torn between the passions of the 
body and the invisible Self (para). Basing his exposition in a decon-
structionist interpretation of the theories of aesthetics by Rājaśekhara, 
Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, he argues that this paradox was 
the result of a close affi liation that existed between the śāstra- and the 
kāvya-vāṅmaya in a sense in which the two set the same goal — the 
release of the Self from the prison of embodiment — but they argued 
for different strategies to obtain it. His main argument rests on the 
premise that the śāstra-vāṅmaya was mostly concerned with the teach-
ing about the ‘double bind of existence’: the pure Self (para) imprisoned 
in the body that constituted the aporia of cognitive–affective motifs in 
existence; nevertheless, it refrained from experiencing it, at least not 
to the extent that the kāvya-vāṅmaya did. If the śāstra-vāṅmaya taught 
us about the paradox of living in the double bind of existence, the 
kāvya-vāṅmaya induced the experiential fl avour (rasa) of living in the 
chiasmatic antimonies of existence. Rao elaborates his argument by say-
ing that the main innovation of Bharata’s rasa theory lay in introducing 
the experiential fl avour of rasa into the aporia of cognitive–affective 
motifs of existence derived from the śāstra-vāṅmaya. If it is said that the 
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two strains of the individual body–emotions–feelings complex and the 
absolute Self met in the kāvya-vāṅmaya, it can be added that the theories 
of aesthetics formalised much of the tension that already existed in the 
śāstra-vāṅmaya. In this view, the poetic drama (kāvya), unlike the śāstra, 
was itself analogised to the body complex inhabited by the Self (ātman). 
In the latter part of his essay, Rao concentrates on showing that the 
emphasis on repletion of desire in the construction of śānta rasa, detected 
in the works of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, was a legacy of 
the Brāhmaṇical emotionlessness. Rao’s argument, however, is framed 
in such a way as to formulate broad generalisations and simplifi ca-
tions that could be avoided by introducing, for example, the relation 
between the ‘desire’ and the ‘ascetic denial’ as forming an aporetic basis 
of the theories of aesthetics, to which we have referred briefl y earlier. 
Still keeping in mind the bulk of the largely repetitive literature written 
on Indian aesthetics in the last few years, Rao’s essay makes an original 
contribution to this topic. 
The essay by Sharad Deshpande, ‘Aesthetics of Despair’ (Chapter 9, 
this volume), is primarily a critique of the ancient rasa theory. He argues 
that the ancient rasa aesthetics promoted specifi c emotions that are no 
longer adequate measures to structure contemporary aesthetic sensibili-
ties, since they do not recognise what is peculiarly modern, namely the 
emotions of despair, banality and absurdity. Despair, argues Deshpande, 
is a dominant emotion in our contemporary times, and as such, it is a 
result of industrialism impelled by the pending forces of technology 
and globalisation. In this scattered reality of existential dislocation and 
fragmented self, despair becomes the existential position of the postmod-
ern world. Despair is no longer a part of a cosmic understanding of our 
existence (an understanding available to ancient people of pre-modern 
times, i.e., Arjuna in the Bhagavadgītā),26 but it is rather a sign of exis-
tential alienation fuelled by materialism and spiritual ignorance. In this 
view, Deshpande argues, that the critique of the ancient rasa aesthetics 
makes us recognise that the aesthetic emotions are structurally related 
to the socio-economic constituencies that appear to be mandatory in 
shaping the general psychology of historical communities. 
Jadunath Sinha’s Indian Psychology
Though it is true that psychology, unlike other branches of knowledge, 
did not reach the privileged status of an independent discipline in 
ancient India, it is also true that psychology, understood as an inquiry 
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into the functioning of mind, occupied a central place in the Indian 
intellectual traditions. In the words of Swami Veda Bharati (2009):
 [I]f one were to ask: on which science the Indian sages have done the most 
thinking, short of meditation itself, the answer would be ‘psychology’, 
understanding mind. It has been done not by objective observations alone. 
The sages have used themselves as guinea pigs. They led their own mind 
through various states of sentiments, concentrations, visualisations, 
silent recitations and other interior devices and observed their effects 
on the mind. 
Bharati makes an important point in asserting that the ancient sages of 
India derived their self-knowledge from introspection, from the shrewd 
observation of mental and emotional states. Moreover, this quest for 
self-knowledge was often deeply embedded in the quest for the ‘given’ 
elements in experience, i.e., ‘there is suffering’ and, consequently, in 
the pursuit of happiness that involved transformation of a person. The 
plethora of topics, such as consciousness, cognition, emotions, percep-
tions, feelings, affect, will, intention, desires, etc., which are understood 
by a prevailing scientifi c attitude of our times as necessary constituen-
cies of ‘psychology’, were a part of a philosophical and religious inquiry 
in virtually all Indian systems of knowledge and practice. Jadunath 
Sinha’s three volumes on Indian Psychology — volume 1: Cognition (1933), 
volume 2: Emotion and Will (1961), and volume 3: Epistemology of Perception 
(1969) — is the best example to illustrate the great extent to which the 
so-called psychological topics are present in the religious and philosophi-
cal systems of India. Sinha recognises the fact that Indian psychology is 
based on metaphysics that locates the potentialities of human existence 
in a broader, more universal scheme of things. In his monumental study, 
Sinha makes a survey of a vast plethora of Indian traditions, showing 
their keen engagement with various psychological themes that range 
from the ‘dualism of the body and the Self’ to the ‘different degrees of 
consciousness and unconsciousness’; the exposition of the so-called 
‘three faults’: desire, aversion and emotion; the ‘distinction of the desire 
as conation’; and the ‘pleasure and pain as feelings’; and ending with 
a comprehensive and explanatory list of the emotional states, such 
as: (a) depression (viṣāda, avasāda, glāni, dainya); (b) fear (bhaya) as the 
apprehension of fear or loss of a desired object; (c) anxiety (udvega) as 
a mental agitation governed by fear; and (d) non-egoism (anahaṃkāra) 
as the absence of longing (spṛhā) for the object of enjoyment, to name 
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a few. Sinha’s Indian Psychology is a fascinating account of the richness 
of psychological themes present in the Indian intellectual traditions. Its 
far-reaching scope is such that it is impossible to give a summary of its 
contents. The author does not concentrate on the historical development 
of psychological ideas that cannot be isolated from their metaphysical 
and philosophical content. This task remains a desideratum for future 
generations of scholars interested in the nature of emotions in India. 
Notes
 1. Hume was suspicious of the excessive resort to reason in philosophy, and in 
life generally; he made a strenuous defence of passion, leaving us the famous 
adage: ‘Reason is and ought to be the slave of passion’. What, however, Hume 
meant by ‘passion’ were simply the feelings, sensations and base affects, 
in which ‘thought’ played an accidental role. Even though he reversed the 
Spinozian model of ‘reason over emotion’, he failed to provide any deeper 
insights into the nature of emotions. For these reasons, Hume’s theory has 
been criticised by de Silva (2011) as ‘shallow’. 
 2. Nussbaum insists on necessary and suffi cient conditions in her study 
(2001: 62).
 3. Especially in the early Upaniṣads, the connection between the cosmos and 
the human body is predominant. As has been demonstrated by Patrick 
Olivelle (1998: 24–27), the Vedic concept of connection (bandhu) employed 
in relation to the cosmic ritual spheres is relegated in the Upaniṣads to 
demonstrating the connection between the cosmic parts and the parts of 
the human body. 
 4. According to the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, upadeśa 3, ‘The ignorant man 
that is fond of this body, which is but a compound of fl esh, blood, ill-smelling 
urine and offal, nerve, fat and bone, will be fond of hell too’ (Khanna and 
Aiyar 2011: 133). 
 5. That such allegations may not be entirely justifi ed have been demonstrated 
by Brian Black (2007: 95). According to him, ‘Yājñavalkya is the fi rst and the 
only Brahmin in the early Upaniṣads who advocates a life of mendicancy’ 
(ibid.). 
 6. According to the Vajrasūci Upaniṣad (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 105), freedom 
from emotion, malice, thirst for worldly objects, desire, delusion, pride, and 
egoism is a qualifying feature of the Brāhmaṇa. 
 7. Louis Dumont (1988) demonstrates how the caste-structured Brāhmaṇical 
society was organised in accordance with the legitimising principle of 
‘relative purity’, founded on the distinction between the pure (represented 
by the Brāhmaṇas) and the impure (represented by the untouchables). In 
upadeśa 3 of the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, an analogy between the impure 
body and the lowest strata of Brāhmaṇical society is even more dramatic: 
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‘An idea of the body being the self should be strenuously abandoned, though 
all should perish. That love of the body is not fi t to be felt by one intent 
upon his welfare, just as a low-caste woman eating dog’s fl esh is unfi t to be 
touched’ (Khanna and Aiyar 2011: 133). 
 8. According to the Skanda Upaniṣad, ‘[t]o free the mind from sensual objects 
is meditation. The subjugation of the senses is cleanings (śauca)’ (Khanna 
and Aiyar 2011: 41). 
 9. For a discussion of the concept of ‘disinterested witness’ (sākṣin) in the 
Advaita Vedānta, see two excellent studies by Bina Gupta (1995, 1998).
10. The other four are Nyāya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, and Vaiśeṣika.
11. For a detailed description of the prakṛtilaya, see Jacobsen (2002: 273–308). 
12. pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkhair guṇa-vṛtti-virodhāś ca duḥkham eva sarvaṃ 
vivekinaḥ.
13. For the possible Brāhmaṇical infl uences on Buddhism, see Bronkhorst (2011). 
14. In Sāṃkhya cosmology, kṣobha is the ‘disturbance’ caused by the proximity 
of puruṣa and prakṛti which disrupts the balance of triguṇa (sattva, rajas and 
tamas) in prakṛti. When this happens, the unmanifest prakṛti gives rise to 
the manifestation of the entire phenomenal existence, which is negatively 
evaluated as the source of suffering. 
15. Suṣumnā is a subtle canal located along the spinal cord in the yogic body 
through which kuṇḍalinī rises.
16. For an exposition of the emotional dimension in the poetry of the Vaiṣṇava 
Āḷvārs, see Hardy (2001). 
17. For a discussion on Rūpa Gosvāmin’s ‘aesthetics of bhakti’, see Haberman 
(2001); Wulff (1986). 
18. Buddhism was founded by Gautama Buddha who lived between 563 and 
483 BCE.
19. The most famous representative of Jainism was Mahāvīra who lived probably 
between 540 and 468 BCE. 
20. As Richard F. Gombrich (2006: 68–70) suggests, the greatest innovation 
of early Buddhism was the implementation of the ‘ethic of intention’, in 
which the moral valuation of an act was dependent solely on the intention 
behind the act; ‘this single move overturns Brāhmaṇical, caste-bound ethics. 
For the intention of a Brahmin cannot be claimed to be ethically of quite 
a different kind from the intention of an outcaste . . . The true Brahmin, 
said the Buddha, was the man of universalistic values as gentleness and 
compassion. An outcast, man with the corresponding vices’. As a matter 
of fact, says Buddha, ‘Not by birth is one a Brahmin or an outcaste, but by 
deeds (Pāli: kamma, Skt: karma)’ (ibid.). 
21. ‘Desire’ is, in this context, a generic category that includes closely related 
terms, such as kāma, rāga and tṛṣṇā. A future study is needed to examine the 
distinctions and similarities between these distinct concepts. 
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22. Among other characteristics of an ideal spectator delineated by Abhinavagupta 
was the spectator’s capacity to experience the ‘universalised’ emotions 
(sādhāraṇīkaraṇa), unaffected by the constraints of individuality. The 
spectator experiencing the ‘universalised’ emotions remained unaffected, 
as it were, by the limiting agents of time, space and the knowing subject. 
To illustrate this argument, we might turn to the following example. In the 
ordinary reality, a potentially dangerous situation, such as an approaching 
tiger, causes fear and anxiety in the subject that shape intervention-
decisions, in this case ‘running away’. However, in the fi ctional reality 
created by art, the arousal of emotions, such as fear, would not urge an 
impulse to run away, even though the emotions experienced at that time 
might affect bodily reactions (sweat, horripilation). It happens so because 
the emotion of fear arising in the spectator viewing a play is not delimited 
by the restriction of time, space and subjectivity. This disengagement from 
the bounds of spatio-temporal limitations and the confi nes of individuality 
that results in the ‘universalisation’ of emotions directly leads to the 
aesthetic experience. Another factor that played a crucial role in ‘aesthetic 
emotionalism’ was ‘identification’ (tanmayībhāva) with the emotional 
situation depicted by the dramatis personae that was so strong that the 
distinction between the experiencing subject and the experienced object 
became blurred. Such a complete emotional involvement on the part of the 
spectator facilitated aesthetic experience sui generis that culminated in the 
savouring of aesthetic delight (rasāsvāda). 
23. In contrast, a passage from the Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad, upadeśa 4, is the 
apotheosis of emotional detachment: ‘[E]ven should he witness or hear of 
the happiness or grief of his wife, brother, son and other relatives, he should 
not be affected thereby. He should abandon all joy and sorrow’ (Khanna and 
Aiyar 2011: 138). 
24. Kāvya refers to the court poetry dominated by one particular theme, that 
of erotic love conveyed by the aesthetic term, śṛṅgāra (Goodwin 1998: 9). 
25. Goodwin (1998: xvi–vii) says that the hero of the kāvya myth, which 
‘functions as a narrative paradigm of a worldview, depicting essential areas 
of confl ict’, is, above all, ‘the portrait of the sentimental hero in his struggle 
with cultural norms that attach a low value to emotion and individual 
autonomy’.
26. In the ancient times, negative emotions, such as despair (viṣāda), gave 
rise to ethical virtues. In a famous passage of the Bhagavadgītā (1.29), 
Arjuna experiences grief (śoka) and laments over the death of his relatives. 
Enveloped in despair (viṣāda), he drops his arrow and bow. The experience 
of despair makes his mind torpid and drains up all his senses. Arjuna’s 
pitiable emotional state is a classic example of the psychology of affect. 
The intrinsic complexity of viṣāda carries within itself the meanings of 
grief, sorrow, distress, suffering, and despair. This negative emotional 
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state is successfully overcome by a quasi-ethical virtue of courage when 
Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna about the universality of dharma. In this process, 
a deeply subjective emotional state of grief and despair is replaced by the 
quasi-ethical virtue of courage. In this way, courage, which is precisely the 
responsibility for ‘living the life according to the universal law of dharma’, 
assumes a greater moral importance than the grief and despair of an agent 
coping with intolerable loss.
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